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It is a remarkable fact that the doctrine of patent law gener-
ally coheres while the doctrine of copyright does not. Two features
sharpen the contrast. First, the two laws perform the same func-
tion. People debate whether these regimes should strive for justice
for creators or economic efficiency for consumers, but no partisan
recommends one goal for patent and another for copyright. Indeed,
the obvious but largely unasked question is why we have two dif-
ferent laws at all, rather than a single system of innovation policy.
Second, lawmakers have fiddled with the two fields for an equally
long time. The first Congress passed its first patent statute on
April 10, 17901 and its first copyright statute less than eight weeks
later.2 One would suppose that the same group working on essen-
tially ,the same problems for the same time would have figured
them out or fouled them up to the same degree. Yet today our law
of patents basically makes sense, while the core of copyright law
continues to be baffling.
Part I of this Article supports the claim that three central ele-
ments of copyright doctrine lack justification and coherence. The
first confounding element is the law of "idea" and "expression,"
with its related doctrine of "merger." Although this law sets forth
the central limit on the extent of copyright protection, it is cast in
conclusory terms that fail to give judges, lawyers, and authors a
way to determine its *scope. The second conundrum is copyright's
test for determining when one work infringes another and, in par-
ticular, the appropriate role for expert versus lay opinion. Here the
problem is not that the law presents a single agreed-upon standard
that is intellectually bankrupt. Rather, the law presents a blizzard
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of contending positions, with no consensus on rules or even on why
the subject producing that blizzard matters at all. The third puzzle
is copyright's requirement of originality, which stands as one of the
very few criteria authors must satisfy to qualify for copyright pro-
tection. The legal definition of originality is strikingly perverse.Part II aims to open a conversation about a remedy for these
apparently disparate problems by showing that they are closely re-
lated. Using an economic perspective on innovation policy, this
.Part defends the notion that we should regard core portions of pat-
ent doctrine as intellectual successes worthy of imitation. Most
fundamentally, patent law establishes a set of sensible and efficient
incentives to creation. Copyright should learn this basic lesson, for
a focus on sound incentives would give copyright doctrine the co-
herence it now lacks.
Patent doctrine, for instance, defines experts as those with or-
dinary skill in the art.3 It sensibly calls upon these experts to iden-
tify cases in which courts can waive patent protection without im-
pairing incentives to create, thereby giving products to consumers
at lower prices whenever possible. In this light, Part III shows how
copyright law could redefine its originality requirement to do the
same. The proposal is for judges to assume that copyright protects
a work unless a defendant offers proof that those with ordinary
skill in the field believe that the incentive of copyright protection
was superfluous to the plaintiff's creation of that work.
Part III also suggests that courts scrap the words "idea" and
"expression" as tools of analysis and use them only to identify con-
clusions reached through a different method of analysis. This Part
again looks to patent.law for guidance about incentives. Copyright
law would best serve consumers if it greeted authors complaining
of copyright infringement with two questions. First, based on a de-
tailed comparison of the parties' works, what exactly did the de-
fendant copy from the plaintiff? Once a court has defirned the pre-
cise thing the defendant took, its second question should be
whether that thing was original to the plaintiff in the sense that
this article proposes for that term: did the thing's creation involve
merely inexpensive borrowing from familiar cultural tradition, or
did its creation require costly investment that the plaintiff made
only in reliance on the promise of copyright? If the former, a court
should call the taken thing an idea and rule for the defendant. If
the latter, a court ought to name it expression and rule for the
3 35 USC § 103 (1988).
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plaintiff-unless the defendant can make the difficult showing that
copyright protection was indeed superfluous as an incentive for the
plaintiff's creation. This Part concludes by applying this incentive
theory from patent law to some leading cases.
Finally, Part IV offers brief and tentative explanations of why
we have the two different bodies of law, and why patent strides
while copyright limps. My suggestion on the first issue is that the
difference stems from a simple matter of frequency: compared with
inventors, authors are extremely numerous. The individualized and
advanced definition of property rights in patent law is simply too
costly for use in copyright law. On the second score, I conjecture
that patent law, despite its sheen of high technology, deals with a
copying problem that is unitary and primitive in comparison with
the array of copying technologies to which copyright law has had
to adapt. Although patent law might seem forbidding, in fact it has
confronted a far simpler policy problem than has the still-
disorganized realm of copyright.
I. THREE PROBLEMS AT THE HEART OF COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE
Our copyright statute devotes dozens of sections to minutiae
but ignores three core problems. This Part sets forth the three
pieces that comprise copyright's doctrinal puzzle.
A. The Metaphysics of Idea and Expression
The most notorious problem in copyright law is the idea/ex-
pression dichotomy.4 The Supreme Court launched this doctrine
more than a century ago.5 Congress codified it in 1976,6 making
clear that it sought to restate rather than to alter the judicial doc-
trine.7 Copyright law gives authors the exclusive right to reproduce
their works of authorship. (I occasionally and synonymously call
these works "texts.") This law currently protects works or texts in
any tangible medium of expression, such as books printed on pa-
per, computer programs recorded on diskette, photographs on
' See, for example, Copyright Law Revision, HR Rep No 94-1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess
57 (1976) (attributing to the pre-1976 law a "basic dichotomy between expression and
idea"); Harper & Row, Publishers v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 556 (1985).
5 Baker v Selden, 101 US 99, 100-01 (1879) ("where the truths of a science or the meth-
ods of an art are the common property of the whole world, any author has the right to
express the one, or explain and use the other, in his own way").
6 17 USC § 102(a), (b) (1988).
7 See HR Rep No 94-1476 at 57 (cited in note 4) ("Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or
contracts the scope of copyright protection under the present law.").
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light-sensitive material, paintings on canvas, and sculptures in
stone. The idea/expression dichotomy limits this protection. It
states that copyright protects authors against the copying of their
expressions but not of their ideas. Thus an author has no recourse
against a free rider who copies only the idea of the copyrighted
work.
Although simple to recite, this basic rule is difficult to make
concrete. In a telling omission, Congress failed to define the key
terms "idea" and "expression." The leading judicial effort to give
meaning to the terms is Judge Learned Hand's abstractions test,
which he announced in Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp.s The
dispute demanded that Hand decide whether moviemakers had ex-
ceeded their rights in borrowing from Nichols's play without per-
mission. Hand formulated his task in this renowned passage:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more
and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be
no more than the most general statement of what the play is
about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is
a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the
use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his
property is never extended.9
This definition of idea and expression makes one long for con-
crete examples. Like Nichols's popular, earlier play Abie's Irish
Rose, Universal's movie The Cohens and the Kellys was a comedy
about two New York families, one Jewish and one Irish, whose off-
spring marry to their fathers' chagrin. Both young couples have
children-twins in the play, a single grandchild in the film. In both
the play and the film, the fathers clash with each other, and at
least one father rejects his progeny. Like the play, the film ends
with reconciliation on all sides. But Judge Hand minimized these
common elements. He concluded that "[a] comedy based upon
conflicts between Irish and Jews, into which the marriage of their
children enters, is no more susceptible of copyright than the out-
8 45 F2d 119 (2d Cir 1930). Compare Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v
McDonald's Corp., 562 F2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir 1977) ("The difficulty comes in attempting
to distill the unprotected idea from the protected expression. No court or commentator in
making this search, has been able to improve upon Judge Learned Hand's famous 'abstrac-
tions test' articulated in Nichols.").
9 Nichols, 45 F2d at 121.
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line of Romeo and Juliet."10 Judge Hand therefore excused Univer-
sal because it took only Nichols's idea, even though Universal's
taking led to many similarities between the works.
This statement of the idea/expression dichotomy expresses a
crucial limitation of the property right by giving every admitted
copier a potential defense. The doctrine's function is essential, but
Judge Hand framed the issue metaphysically, and in a way that
gives metaphysics a bad name.1 As he stated it, the idea/expres-
sion doctrine is incoherent and lacks any stated alternative foun-
dation. The result is a doctrine that announces results but does not
determine or justify them.
1. The false dichotomy of idea and expression.
This law is founded on a claimed polarity whose opposites can
turn into each other with alarming ease. In common usage, an idea
is an intangible and abstract thought. But an idea inevitably be-
comes a concrete expression as soon as a human states it. That is,
an idea cannot be defined or communicated to another person
without becoming an expression, a particular and precise collection
of meaningful symbols. For example, I might think about "the
comedy of warring clans spawning offspring who cross clan barri-
ers." But as soon as I utter those words, I have made my idea into
expression-literally. 2
By the same token, an expression always is an idea, a concept
that can be taken into the brain and imagined in greater detail and
in different forms. Anna Karenina, for instance, seems like a fully
elaborated expression. But Tolstoy's expression leaves countless
creative options for even the most devotedly authentic interpreter.
The pages and pages of print were but an idea for the writer who
penned the screenplay for the movie, the director who directed it,
the actors who animated it, the cinematographer who shot it, and
the engineers who made its footfalls sound cheerfully solid or
spookily hollow. Tolstoy gave them all an idea, but just an idea,
about what to do. And they in turn expressed
themselves-literally.
10 Id at 122.
" But see Sir David Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas 84-89, 239-45 (Greenwood, 1951)
(distinguishing Forms or Ideas from things sensed in the world).
" See also Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of
Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U Chi L Rev 1009, 1023-24 & n 56
(1990) ("it is hard to imagine how an idea, once expressed in words or otherwise given form,
could fail to be part of a 'work of authorship' ").
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The terms "idea" and "expression" gave Judge Hand no guid-
ance at all in deciding whether Universal had acted lawfully. Sup-
pose I describe what Universal copied from Nichols as "the comical
story of the conflict between a New York Jewish family and an
Irish Catholic family in which the children fall in love, their fa-
thers oppose their marriage plans on cultural and religious
grounds, the kids get married secretly, the fathers become furious,
but eventually there is a reconciliation." This plot description is
simultaneously an idea that can be further elaborated (as for in-
stance Universal's film did) and an expression in and of itself (a
meaningful communication comprised of fixed symbols). Alterna-
tively, imagine the text of the play Abie's Irish Rose lying before
you in a binder, as though Nichols had just finished writing it.
That text also is both an idea susceptible of further elaboration
(either in print or in a different medium) and an expression, com-
plete in and of itself. Judge Hand officially attributed the plot
description to the public domain as idea and the text of the play to
Nichols as expression. Yet, as a literal matter, the doctrine entitled
him to switch the assignments. There is, after all, nothing literally
wrong with calling a spade a spade-or a playing card-when both
descriptions fit exactly.
This literal analysis shows that the supposed idea/expression
dichotomy does not identify two boxes at all, but only a single bat-
tered crate. It flunks the basic test for useful legal distinctions be-
cause its falsely dichotomous character subverts its ability to gen-
erate robust conclusions. Because the rule provides no technique
for excluding competing resolutions, its use is always incomplete
and always susceptible to critique by its own terms. This weakness
means that litigants and judges can run amok with the incoher-
ences of the idea/expression dichotomy and the rule cannot chide
them for it.
2. The measurelessness of abstraction.
One might accept this literal critique but still respond that the
idea/expression doctrine, as Judge Hand defined it, is not truly
about ideas and expressions. Rather, one might argue, the doctrine
is about more abstract or less abstract versions of a text, in that it
bars free riders from copying in detail but permits them to
reproduce a relatively abstract version of a work. This account
would conclude that Universal copied lawfully because, rather than
taking Nichols's play verbatim, it took only a highly abstracted
version of the play. Yet this nonliteral "series of abstractions" ac-
count also fails. It depends on, but fails to deliver, a reliable yard-
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stick to measure the property. When property owners want to
build a wall 25 feet from their front door, they can be sure that a
foot means 12 inches. Inches are stable and verifiable units. But
the Bureau of Weights and Measures keeps no standard for mea-
suring abstraction, and it is impossible even to imagine what sort
of scale could gauge this quality reliably. We have no ruler for a
problem in which measurement is crucial.
Neither do the particular facts of decided cases create a usea-
ble ruler from precedent. One might wish, for instance, that Judge
Hand's decision in Nichols defined the degree to which a film-
maker was free to take from the works of playwrights without their
consent. But Judge Hand himself foiled this hope six years later in
his celebrated1 3 opinion in Sheldon v Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp.,'4 which together with Nichols created a Hand-made dyad
that every copyright casebook author since has included.
In Sheldon, Judge Hand drew a sharply different conclusion
from facts superficially similar to those in Nichols. The defend-
ant's movie Letty Lynton and the plaintiff's play Dishonored Lady
were both based on the actual exploits of the nineteenth-century
Scot Madeleine Smith. These stories recounted "the acquittal of a
wanton young woman, who to extricate herself from an amour that
stood in the way of a respectable marriage, poisoned her lover."' 5
The court held that "the plaintiffs' originality is necessarily limited
to the variants they introduced" to the historical facts used in
their play.'6 But Judge Hand found that this contribution by the
plaintiffs had been large; the play's authors had taken "the merest
skeleton" from historical fact, and "[t]he incidents, the characters,
the mis en scene, the sequence of events, were all changed ....
The defendants' movie, moreover, had borrowed many details of
characterization, the same mis en scene, and considerable and par-
ticular parallelisms of incident. Hand concluded that "these details
13 See, for example, Ralph S. Brown and Robert C. Denicola, Cases on Copyright 210
(Foundation, 5th ed 1990) (including next to the text of the Sheldon opinion a portrait of a
somber and pensive Judge Hand and the comment that "[w]hat George Wharton Pepper
said of the Sheldon opinion can be many times justly repeated about Judge Hand's writings:
'The entire opinion exhibits craftsmanship at its best and is entitled to be ranked as a
model of judicial style.' George Wharton Pepper, The Literary Style of Learned Hand, 60
Harv L Rev 333, 341 (1947).").
14 81 F2d 49 (2d Cir 1936).
Id at 50.
Id at 54.
17 Id at 50.
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in the same sequence embody more than the 'ideas' of the play;
they are its very raiment."'"
My point is not that the two opinions are inconsistent; later I
shall argue just the opposite."' Nor do I suggest that the Sheldon
opinion casts no light on the extent of copyright owners' rights.
Repeated decisions can enable one to detect and articulate an im-
plicit doctrine or useful process of reasoning at work, something I
next attempt. My point here is that Nichols's series of abstractions
imagery did not assist Judge Hand in deciding Sheldon. In defend-
ing his resolution in light of Nichols, Judge Hand said only that
the moviemakers were within their rights if they used "only the
more general patterns [of the play]; that is, if they kept clear of its
'expression.' ,,20 In reverting to the term "expression," Judge Hand
begged the very question at issue, effectively confessing that our
language's descriptions of the varieties of abstractions do not af-
ford a reliable rule of decision.
My charges of unmoored doctrinal ad hockery find support in,
of all places, the language of Nichols. The author of the abstrac-
tions test jolts us by endorsing rather than rebutting the critique.
Judge Hand agreed that "the decisions cannot help much in a new
case"2-1a conclusion that, if true, largely destroys the supposed
rule of law in a realm of statutory silence. After describing the se-
ries of abstractions that he offered as a technique for locating the
boundary between the privately owned expression and the publicly
available idea, Judge Hand jarringly announced that "[n]obody has
ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can. '22 He
concluded with the lament that "we are as aware as any one that
the line, wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary .... In an-
other opinion he declared, "Obviously, no principle can be stated
as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has
borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be
ad hoc."'24
These confessions are startling. They read as though Duncan
Kennedy had traveled back in time and convinced a fixture of the
judicial establishment to plant subversive seeds for his followers to
harvest a half century later. Agreeing with this criticism, Judge
18 Id at 55.
19 See text at notes 130-52.
20 Sheldon, 81 F2d at 54.
11 Nichols, 45 F2d at 121.
22 Id.
23 Id at 122.
24 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F2d 487, 489 (2d Cir 1960).
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Frank Easterbrook has written that although Hand's "opinions
still dominate this corner of the law, . . . [his] 'abstractions test'
... . is not a 'test' at all. It is a clever way to pose the difficulties
that . . . . does little to help resolve a given case .... ,5
3. The manipulability of merger.
Later opinions add material for this critique by embroidering
the idea/expression dichotomy with the thread of the so-called
merger doctrine. Merger doctrine holds that copyright protection
lapses for a work in which idea and expression "merge ' 26 or be-
come "inseparable. 2 7 We should become suspicious upon hearing
that it is possible for two supposedly dichotomous concepts to
merge into inseparable unity. The doctrine of merger announces
this phenomenon, however, whenever "there are no or few other
ways of expressing a particular idea" apart from the plaintiff's par-
ticular expression. 2s In such instances, courts claim to break with
their normal practice by giving later authors freedom to copy the
first author's expression. The rationale is that this freedom is nec-
essary to liberate for copying the first author's idea-which axio-
matically can never be subject to copyright protection.29
The case commonly cited as the doctrine's source and its clas-
sic illustration, even though it failed to use the word "merger," is
Morrissey v Proctor & Gamble Co.30 Morrissey sued Proctor &
Gamble for copying the rules for a promotional sweepstakes con-
test based on participants' social security numbers. Notwithstand-
ing the nearly verbatim copying, the court worried that "to permit
copyrighting would mean that a party ... by copyrighting a mere
handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the
substance."3' The court thus excused Proctor & Gamble's copying
because Morrissey's idea (or substance) and expression had
merged.
The Morrissey result probably makes sense. But indetermi-
nacy overwhelms its logic of merger. Before a court can decide
28 Nash v CBS, 899 F2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir 1990).
2 See, for example, Apple Computer, Inc. v Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F2d 1240,
1253 (3d Cir 1983).
27 See, for example, Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v Kalpakian, 446 F2d 738, 742
(9th Cir 1971).
28 Apple Computer, 714 F2d at 1253 (emphasis added).
2 See, for example, Toro Co. v R & R Products Co., 787 F2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir 1986)
(dictum).
30 379 F2d 675 (1st Cir 1967).
21 Id at 678 (emphasis added).
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whether "there are no or few other ways of expressing" plaintiff's
idea, it must define the plaintiff's idea. No unique abstract descrip-
tion or idea is self-evidently appropriate; instead there exists, as
Judge Hand pointed out, "a great number of patterns of increasing
generality [that] will fit equally well, as more and more of the [de-
tail] is left out. '32 As usual, the crucial doctrine remains mute
about how far up the scale the judge should proceed before testing
the number of alternative expressions. Without a scale, it is impos-
sible to say. Nonetheless, cases applying the merger doctrine inevi-
tably do say, settling on an implicit specification of idea that con-
fines alternative means of expression to a relatively small number.
Also inevitably, however, a variety of alternative definitions re-
mains both conceivable and consistent with the malleable doctrinal
terms. The merger doctrine's use of idea and expression thus is
characteristically open-ended-useful for announcing a decision,
but not for generating or justifying one.
To demonstrate a critique that applies to every case invoking
or rejecting the merger doctrine, observe first that the Morrissey
court implicitly defined the idea as "advertising using a sweep-
stakes based on social security numbers. 3 3 Defining idea so nar-
rowly does leave a relatively small number of alternative expres-
sions. (Actually, the number of equivalent rephrasings probably
runs to the hundreds or thousands, but this quibble is at once di-
gressive and fantastically tedious to verify.) We can multiply these
alternative possibilities to a countlessly large number and thus ne-
gate merger simply by choosing a more abstract definition of the
idea. For instance, it is equally accurate to define the idea of Mor-
rissey as "advertising using a sweepstakes based on a number."
One can generate contest numbers in an endless number of differ-
ent ways: phone numbers, birthdays, addresses, guesses about the
daily volume of the New York Stock Exchange or the point spread
in some athletic contest, or eight digit numbers picked at random.
In doctrinal terms, merger dissolves and Morrissey wins. To the
same end, we could define Morrissey's idea simply as "advertising
using a sweepstakes," or even more simply as just "advertising."
The merger doctrine contains no logical rule for selecting the deci-
sive level of abstraction.
As I have already said, Morrissey's outcome probably makes
sense, as do the outcomes in Nichols and Sheldon. But the doc-
trine that justifies these results is inconclusive and ultimately arbi-
32 Nichols, 45 F2d at 121.
Morrissey, 379 F2d at 676.
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trary. Every mention of idea and expression states legal conclu-
sions while doing nothing to justify them. Every utterance of the
terms should prompt lawyers and judges to ask, "Why does copy-
right law allow defendants to copy this thing labeled an 'idea'?
How do we know that plaintiffs cannot appropriate some other
thing called 'expression'?" To these basic questions, the doctrine of
idea and expression can offer no answers. The kindred merger doc-
trine merely buries more deeply the questions it begs.
B. Confusion About the Relevance of Expert Opinion
A second core problem in the law of copyright concerns the
use of expert opinion in infringement cases. The variety of judicial
attitudes is remarkable. Some courts demonstrate absolutely no in-
terest in either highlighting or limiting the use of expert opinion.
Other courts banish experts altogether. Still other courts set forth
involved and separate roles for expert and lay opinions, even while
disagreeing with each other about the definition of these roles. To
complete the circle, other courts defer completely to expert opinion
on the matter of copyright infringement. Yet for all this diversity
of attitude, the cases offer no understanding of the consequences
at stake or the considerations that ought to control.
As a matter of copyright doctrine, some courts ignore the
question of experts altogether. For instance, when the owners of
the Chiffons' hit "He's So Fine" claimed that George Harrison's
song "My Sweet Lord" infringed their copyright, District Judge
Owen displayed complete indifference about distinguishing expert
from lay opinion.34 He permitted expert witnesses to testify, 5 but
expressed neither aversion nor deference to their views. Rather, he
compared the two tunes (including their musical notations) and
announced that "the two songs are virtually identical." 6 The court
apparently viewed the matter of experts not as a special issue in
the law of copyright, but rather as a background question to be
handled by the law of evidence. 7
Judge Hand, in contrast, was direct in his condemnation of
expert witnesses. In Nichols, he wrote that in copyright cases the
testimony of an expert
" Bright Tunes Music Corp. v Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F Supp 177 (S D NY 1976).
35 Id at 177 nn 3, 6; 180 n 11.
s' Id at 180.
See, for example, FRE 702 (court can permit expert testimony when helpful to trier
of fact).
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ought not to be allowed at all; . . .it cumbers the case and
tends toward confusion, for the more the court is led into the
intricacies of dramatic craftsmanship, the less likely it is to
stand upon the firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered
impressions upon its own perusal. We hope that in this class
of cases such evidence may in the future be entirely excluded
s
Elsewhere, Judge Hand announced that the extent of copyright
protection should be tested from the standpoint of the "ordinary
observer."39
Yet Judge Hand joined Judge Frank's majority opinion in the
famous case of Arnstein v Porter, which stressed the importance of
separating two different elements of the plaintiff's case: (1)
whether the defendant copied from plaintiff's copyrighted work;
and (2) whether the copying constituted illicit or improper appro-
priation.40 The second issue appears to be the familiar question of
whether the plaintiff took expression or mere idea (although Judge
Frank did "not use that terminology). Arnstein's treatment of this
second issue was entirely consistent with Judge Hand's aversion to
experts, for the court wrote that the issue was to be judged by "the
response of the ordinary lay hearer; accordingly, on that issue, 'dis-
section' and expert testimony are irrelevant."'"
This distaste for experts did not extend, however, to the first
issue of whether the defendant had produced the accused work by
gaining access to and copying the plaintiff's creation. On this mat-
ter, Judge Frank curtly and without citation declared that "analy-
sis ('dissection') is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be
received to aid the trier of the facts. '4 2 This sharp and unex-
plained departure from the rejection of expert opinion leaves read-
ers wondering why expert opinion is misleading about ideas and
expressions but instructive about copying. Moreover, this sentence
equates the relevance of expert testimony with the practice of
"analysis ('dissection')"-a practice epitomized by Nichols, the
Nichols, 45 F2d at 123.
'9 Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F2d at 489.
-0 154 F2d 464, 468 (2d Cir 1946).
"I Id. See also id at 473 ("The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from
plaintiff's work so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropri-
ated something which belongs to the plaintiff."). But compare id ("Expert testimony of mu-
sicians may also be received, but it will in no way be controlling on the issue of illicit copy-
ing, and should be utilized only to assist in determining the reactions of lay auditors.").
42 Id at 468 (emphasis added).
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very opinion that condemned the use of experts. To this point,
then, one can conclude only that famous judges have had opinions
about experts in copyright infringement cases that are forceful and
particular, but puzzling.
One cannot dismiss as freakish Arnstein's opaque directive
that experts are to be shunned for some copyright purposes but
embraced for others. The Ninth Circuit likewise has set, forth pre-
cisely limited roles for experts and lay observers in the widely cited
case of Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v McDonald's
Corp.43 To readers' frustration, however, the Ninth Circuit defined
these roles in different terms; the KrofJt court said its tests, while
similar to those in Arnstein, did not "resurrect the Arnstein ap-
proach.'44 Krofft did follow Arnstein precisely, however, in its fail-
ure to explain the significance of the issue of expert opinion to
which it devoted such detail.
In Krofft, the court announced that it would perform two tests
to decide the question of copyright infringement: an extrinsic test
and an intrinsic test.45 The "extrinsic" test, the court said, aimed
to decide whether there was substantial similarity between the
ideas of the works of the plaintiff and of the defendant. "[This
test] is extrinsic because it depends not on the responses of the
trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and ana-
lyzed. . . .Since it is an extrinsic test, analytical dissection and
expert testimony are appropriate. '46 A plaintiff who satisfies the
extrinsic test goes on to confront the intrinsic test, which seeks to
determine whether there is substantial similarity between the ex-
pressions of the two works. This test turns on the response of the
ordinary reasonable person. "It is intrinsic because it does not de-
pend on the type of external criteria and analysis which marks the
extrinsic test .... Because this is an intrinsic test, analytic dissec-
tion and expert testimony are not appropriate. '47 Krofft's exacti-
tude implied that expert opinion fulfills some clear and definite
function. But once again readers must wonder what that function
is.
The Ninth Circuit recently renamed the Krofft tests but re-
tained their riddle. The decision in Shaw v Lindheim stated that
"' 562 F2d 1157. See also Shaw v Lindheim, 908 F2d 531, 534-36 (9th Cir 1990) (ex-
pounding Krofft).
" 562 F2d at 1165 n 7.
" Id at 1164.
46 Id (emphasis added).
47 Id (emphasis added).
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"the. two [Krofft] tests are more sensibly described as objective
and subjective analyses of expression,"48 and reiterated the rele-
vance of experts to the former but not the latter:
The imagery presented in a literary work may also engage the
imagination of the audience and evoke an emotional response.
Because each of us differs, to some degree, in our capacity to
reason, imagine, and react emotionally, subjective compari-
sons of literary works that are objectively similar in their ex-
pression of ideas must be left to the trier of fact.4
This statement does not reveal the point of isolating expert evi-
dence. Rather it implies that the jury's gut governs copyright liti-
gation-a stance that would randomize results and could please no
one except copyright litigators and their heirs.
Other courts have altogether jettisoned the intricacies of Arn-
stein and Krofft. At least when confronted with copyright litiga-
tion concerning "exceptionally difficult materials, like computer
programs," these courts favor a single inquiry about "substantial
similarity" to which both lay and expert testimony is admissible."0
They reason that the programs' complexity and unfamiliarity to
most members of the public renders an "ordinary observer" test of
doubtful value. They add that a two-step analysis unrealistically
assumes that factfinders can or will forget what they learned in one
step when applying the other.51 This second criticism makes one
question the benefit of such an apparently artificial exercise
outside the computer context.
To complete the circle, another Ninth Circuit decision has de-
clared in effect that expert opinion may be the only relevant basis
for analysis of computer program infringement. Johnson Controls
v Phoenix Control Systems stated a rule nearly free of content:
whether copyright protects the "non-literal components" of a com-
puter program, including its "structure, sequence and organization
and user interface," depends on whether the particular component
in question qualifies as expression or idea-an inquiry that itself
depends "on the particular facts of each case."52 The court claimed
11 908 F2d at 535 (emphasis in original).
49 Id at 538.
"o Whelan Associates v Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir 1986).
See also E.F. Johnson Co. v Uniden Corp., 623 F Supp 1485, 1493 (D Minn 1985); Hubco
Data Products Corp. v Management Assistance Inc., 219 USPQ 450 (D Idaho 1983); Mid-
way Manufacturing Co. v Strohon, 564 F Supp 741, 752-53 (N D Ill 1983).
Whelan, 797 F2d at 1232-33.
52 886 F2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir 1989).
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that the relevant perspective was that of "a reasonable person in
the intended audience," citing Krofft as support.5 3 But the only
evidence or analysis that the panel offered for its holding that the
plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary injunction was the district
court's reasoning, which in turn appeared to depend largely or ex-
clusively on the report of a special master, whom the defendant
accused of being in reality a court-appointed expert. 4 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this complaint as untimely, therefore leaving un-
disturbed the judicial deference to the special master's purportedly
expert views.
Thus we witness the wide array of judicial attitudes towards
expert opinion. Until we gain some notion of the purpose of distin-
guishing between the opinions of experts and those of laypersons,
we must simply accept this array as puzzling and unpredictable. In
a second respect, therefore, copyright doctrine seems adrift.
C. The Perversity of Defining Originality as Variation
A third puzzle at the heart of copyright doctrine is the re-
quirement of originality or novelty. The 1976 Act states that copy-
right will protect works of authorship that are "original," yet it
leaves the key word undefined. 5 This silence has forced the courts
to decide how original a work must be for copyright protection to
apply. The question typically arises when a plaintiff sues for copy-
right infringement and the defendant replies that the plaintiff's
work is not sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection.
(Some courts say this defense raises the issue of work of author-
ship rather than originality,5 but I use the latter, more conven-
tional label for the same concern.) Courts confronted by such de-
fenses agree that copyright law demands less originality than does
the law of patent. Beyond that agreement, the judicial definitions
of copyright originality have been perplexing and contradictory.
A leading case illustrating this doctrine's unhappy state is Bell
v Catalda.5 7 Print producer Bell contracted for copies of old mas-
ters' paintings, including Pinkie and Blue Boy, that were in the
public domain. Bell specified that the reproductions be by mezzo-
53 Id at 1176 n 4, citing Krofft, 562 F2d at 1166-67.
54 Id at 1176.
" 17 USC §§ 102(a), 101.
56 See, for example, Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
805 F2d 663, 668 n 6 (7th Cir 1986); Atari Games Corp. v Oman, 693 F Supp 1204 (D DC
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 888 F2d 878, 882 (DC Cir 1989).
'7 Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F2d 99 (2d Cir 1951), aff'g 86 F
Supp 399 (S D NY 1949); see also 74 F Supp 973 (S D NY 1947).
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tinting, which permitted "quite a satisfactory reproduction of the
original painting in whatever size desired . . . , preserving the soft-
ness of line which is characteristic of the oil painting.'"58 Catalda
copied these mezzotints, sold the copies, and defended against
Bell's consequent copyright suit by arguing that copyright law
ought not protect anything so unoriginal as mezzotint copies of old
masters.
In rejecting this argument, Judge Frank's opinion gave a bad
justification for a good result. His logic followed two conflicting
and unsatisfactory strains. The first emphasized the smallness of
copyright's requirement of originality. One passage explained that
the originality that copyright demands of authors is far more mod-
est than the novelty that patent law requires of inventors. "'Origi-
nal' in reference to a copyright work means that the particular
work 'owes its origin' to the 'author.' No large measure of novelty
is necessary."59 If this famous passage gives us any information at
all, it tends towards paradox and internal contradiction. Such mis-
leading usage suggests that I can make or author an original copy
of Anna Karenina simply by standing at the copying machine with
enough nickels, for the photocopy "owes its origin" to me.
If works are original when they owe their origin to their au-
thor, why then is not every copyist an author and every copy that
exists therefore original? Most people would regard this definition
of original as paradoxical, or at least silly. Moreover, Judge Frank's
second sentence contradicts this implication by observing that
copyright requires no large amount of originality-thereby imply-
ing that copyright does require at least some measure. Judge Frank
could have given content to this formulation by defining with care
the word "author," but instead he simply surrounded the term
with quotation marks.6 0 In a similar vein, Judge Frank wrote that
"[o]riginality in this context means little more than a prohibition
of actual copying" 1-a formulation that again leaves mystery as
to why Bell's protected art reproduction counted as more than un-
protected "actual copying" of the old master it portrayed. Judge
Frank's first line of reasoning thus failed to define copyright's orig-
inality requirement in a tractable way.
88 74 F Supp at 975, 979.
6 191 F2d at 102 (citation omitted). See also 191 F2d at 104 ("[t]he mezzotints ...
'originated' with those who made them").
80 See id at 100, 102, 103, and 105.
81 Id at 103 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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His second line of reasoning stumbled by stressing the extent
of variation between the original old masters and the plaintiff's
mezzotints:
All that is needed [is to contribute] something more than a
"merely trivial" variation, something recognizably "his own."
• * * No matter how poor artistically the "author's" addition,
it is enough if it be his own.
There is evidence that [the mezzotints] were not intended to,
and did not, imitate the paintings they reproduced. But even
if their substantial departures from the paintings were inad-
vertent, the copyrights would be valid. A copyist's bad eye-
sight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of
thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations.
Having hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the "au-
thor" may adopt it as his and copyright it.62
Two failures blight this logic. First, we are agog to hear Judge
Frank treat as credible any evidence that mezzotint copies "were
not intended to, and did not, imitate the paintings they repro-
duced." This sentence can barely be read with a straight face. Its
final word alone confounds its claim. 3
Second, and of more general significance, it is perverse to con-
dition copyright protection upon a demand that authors include
variations between their work and the things they aim to portray.
Since its inception, American copyright law has protected works
whose quality largely depends on the absence of variation between
subject and rendition. For instance, the Copyright Act of 1790 pro-
tected maps and charts. The last thing navigators want is variation
for the sake of originality.6 4 Copyright also protects telephone di-
rectories, where the notion of changes for the sake of originality is
arresting. In fact, it is remarkable that a judge should have defined
originality as variation in a case about collector-quality art repro-
ductions. The uninitiated would think that protection should in-
stead correspond to the accuracy of the reproduction.
Fortunately, Bell v Catalda never made good on its threat to
withhold copyright protection absent proof of variation. After an-
nouncing the requirement, Judge Frank neglected to demonstrate
"2 Id at 102-05 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
63 See also 74 F Supp at 975 ("The artists employed to produce these mezzotint engrav-
ings in suit attempted faithfully to reproduce paintings in the mezzotint medium so that the
basic idea, arrangement, and color scheme of each painting are those of the original artist.").
" See Bell, 191 F2d at 101 (Congress "authorized the copyrighting of a mere map
which, patently, calls for no considerable uniqueness.").
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that the plaintiff satisfied it. 5 Later courts, however, have not
been so beneficially careless. The Second Circuit's en banc decision
in Batlin & Son v Snyder ruled for the defendant on the ground
that "to support a copyright there must be at least some substan-
tial variation, not merely a trivial variation as might occur in the
translation to a different medium. '66
The disease has infected the heartland. In Gracen v Bradford
Exchange, the Seventh Circuit hailed the Batlin rule as "a deci-
sion of the Second Circuit-the nation's premier copyright
court-sitting en banc." 6 Yet Gracen applies the substantial vari-
ation test in a situation where its operation is just as alarming as in
Bell v Catalda. Bradford Exchange obtained from MGM the rights
to make and sell a Wizard of Oz series of collector plates, which
are dinner plates with pictures. Bradford held a contest to select
an artist for the series, which Gracen won by painting a picture of
Judy Garland as Dorothy on the yellow brick road. After negotia-
tions with Gracen stalled, Bradford hired another artist to make a
"piratical copy"68 of Gracen's painting. When Bradford sold plates
displaying this image, Gracen sued. Judge Posner affirmed a grant
of summary judgment to Bradford on the alternative ground that
Gracen's painting contained insufficient variation from the film
images.6 9
This holding exemplifies the perversity of every effort to de-
fine originality in terms of variation. Bradford held a contest to
find an image of The Wizard of Oz that impressed the most people
as the most familiar rendition of the motion picture. Bradford's
contest instructions stressed that "your Judy/Dorothy must be
very recognizable as everybody's Judy/Dorothy. ' '70 Consistent in its
attitude, Bradford praised its winner as "a true prodigy," saying
that hers "was the one painting that conveyed the essence of
Judy's character in the film .. .the painting that left everybody
saying, 'That's Judy in Oz.' ",71 Yet the prize for faithful accuracy
doomed Gracen's copyright suit, for Judge Posner thought her
65 See id at 104-05 (demanding "distinguishable variations" without explaining what
they might be).
66 536 F2d 486, 491 (2d Cir 1976) (en banc). See also Durham Industries, Inc. v Tomy
Corp., 630 F2d 905, 909 (2d Cir 1980) (reiterating support for the standard announced in
Batlin).
698 F2d 300, 305 (7th Cir 1983).
6 Id at 301, quoting Gracen's counsel.
Id at 305.
70 Id at 301 (emphasis omitted).
71 Id.
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painting looked hardly different from the movie. The court con-
demned Gracen for achieving precisely her creative goal.
The Gracen court argued that judges must demand variations
in reproductions "to avoid entangling subsequent artists depicting
the underlying work in copyright problems." 2 This claim that
proof problems justify a perverse definition of originality is unper-
suasive. Most tellingly, the court embraced the argument in a case
in which it did not apply; the court expressly identified the facts
that made plausible its summary judgment supposition that the
Bradford plate indeed was a "piratical copy" of Gracen's paint-
ing.1 3 If difficult questions of proof indeed arise in future cases, the
appropriate solution is a high standard of proof for plaintiffs-not
a definition of originality that punishes them for successfully
achieving a goal that is socially deserving and efficient.
In sum, the copyright requirement of originality makes no
sense because it claims variation as a virtue, while authors of many
objects of copyright protection rightly regard variation as a vice.
Certainly not every author aims to avoid variations on what has
gone before, but copyright law embarrasses itself by assuming that
authors never have such goals. Moreover, the cases in which the
issue of originality is apt to arise-disputes about art reproduc-
tions, film memorials, and the like-are just the ones where the
objective of trustworthy rendition is most likely. Copyright law has
erred to insist that works contain variations in order to gain pro-
tection. But the case law offers us nowhere else to turn, and the
statute simply ignores the problem.
II. USING PATENT LAW TO RATIONALIZE COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE
This Part aims to inspire discussion about the appropriate
doctrinal solutions to the problems of idea and expression, expert
opinion, and originality. The Part begins by introducing an eco-
nomic perspective and using it to account for the core elements of
patent law. The remainder then uses patent law's success to sug-
gest answers to the three copyright questions.
71 Id at 305. See also William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analy-
sis of Copyright Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325, 356 (1989) ("If the derivative work is only trivi-
ally different from the original, it may be impossible to determine whether an infringing
work was copied from (and hence infringed) the derivative work, the original, or both.");
Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol 108,
111 n 7 (1990) ("the costs of tracing supply a strong argument for an arbitrary cutoff in
intellectual property rights").
73 Gracen, 698 F2d at 301-02.
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A. The Debate Over Patent and Copyright Goals
Patent and copyright law share the common objective of re-
warding innovation to encourage the creation of new "informa-
tion." I place the word in quotation marks because I use it in an
especially general way. (This discussion will not draw the distinc-
tion that some have between "invention" and "innovation.") Pat-
ent law promotes the discovery of new information about useful
inventions, while copyright covers more diverse endeavors. Infor-
mation in the forms of a pleasing or significant array of paint on a
canvas, of sounds that comprise a catchy tune or a moving con-
certo, or of code for a new computer program may receive copy-
right protection. Why reward all these various new creations? One
can do so for the benefit of either consumers or producers. This
section explains and adopts a consumer-oriented theory of copy-
right law.
Consumer-oriented innovation policy aims to achieve eco-
nomic efficiency. A standard analysis of market behavior concludes
that business firms will fail to produce the right amount of the
general class of products known as "public goods." Lighthouses ex-
emplify the public good's key characteristic: the creator cannot ex-
clude users who do not pay.74 This nonexcludability predictably
hampers or entirely frustrates producers' efforts to charge for con-
sumers' use. The absence of a compensation mechanism suggests
that private producers will simply not bother creating the correct
number of public goods in the first place, though consumers want
the goods. Everyone loses.
In relevant respects, new information is a public good. If we
treat newly created information like the beam from a light-
house-available to all without charge-inventors may devote too
few resources to research and development, and authors too little
time to writing new books. Inventors or authors can possess un-
doubted legal title to a physical embodiment of their creation. But
if ownership of a particular machine or book still allows others the
-liberty to copy the new information in other machines or books, we
may encounter a standard public goods market failure. Inventors
may underinvent, and authors underwrite, out of conviction that
expensive creation would only prompt free riders to swoop in and
make off with the revenues necessary to justify the initial creative
effort. Consumers suffer along with producers because producers
71 But see Ronald A. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J L & Econ 357 (1974).
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who decide they would rather play golf strand consumers without
the new inventions and works of authorship the consumers desire.
There are routine solutions to public goods problems. As with
lighthouses, the government can finance the creation directly and
give the good away. For the most part, however, our country seeks
to stimulate the creation of information through property rights,
not public subsidies. Patents and copyrights provide such exclusive
property rights. From a consumer perspective, then, the point of
patent and copyright law is to create incentives for producers so
that they will serve consumers' needs. Producers are but means to
the ultimate end of consumer satisfaction. And the relevant focus
is the ex ante creation of incentives, not an- ex post analysis of
75fairness.
It is important to distinguish this view from producer-oriented
innovation policy, which asserts that creators' labor entitles them
to the exclusive control of its fruit. The reason is fairness, not con-
sumer well-being. A free rider who copies an inventor's discovery
or an author's work causes a potential problem of theft, not ineffi-
ciency. On this account, patent and copyright exist to vindicate the
moral entitlements that creators earn through their creation. Pro-
ducers in this framework are not means but ends in themselves,
humans to whom the law owes a duty of fairness. 76
By my lights, the economists have a better argument than the
philosophers. The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries. 7 7 This fundamental
warrant for federal innovation policy speaks in terms of incentives,
not justice. It does so both by specifying its goal as "progress of
Science and useful Arts" and by limiting the duration of its exclu-
sive rights. In addition, proponents of a producer-oriented theory
of copyright have yet to offer a decisive response to Judge Breyer's
20-year-old critique of their position. 8
75 Compare Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165 (1967); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv L Rev 4, 10 (1984).
7' See, for example, Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doc-
trine, 103 Harv L Rev 1137 (1990); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copy-
right: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 Stan L Rev
1343 (1989); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Georgetown L J
287 (1988).
77 US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8.
71 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv L Rev 281, 284-91 (1970). See also Richard
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A consumer perspective on incentives is undeniably relevant
to a normative analysis of patent and copyright law. This work
proceeds from that perspective. I do not claim that the framework
of economic efficiency is necessarily the only relevant rubric. More-
over, this debate about values is exciting mostly in the abstract.
The two analyses tend to converge as a practical matter, because
law governing innovation policy usually must treat creators fairly
in order to give them the incentives to act in ways that benefit
consumers. As my concrete conclusions will show, the efficiency
perspective generally reflects moral justice as well as economic
sense.
B. The Good Sense of Much Patent Doctrine
The relevant and central portions of patent doctrine create a
clear and logically tractable system of incentives. This law prompts
successful inventors to create and, if successful, swiftly to submit
applications that define the inventor's exact contribution. Inven-
tors haggle with the patent examiner in charge of the case at the
federal Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The examiner checks
the state of the art and denies the patent if the inventor's work is
obvious in that light. The inventor then usually tries to negotiate a
sufficiently narrowed definition of the invention so that this
smaller and different advancement no longer appears obvious to
the examiner. If the negotiation succeeds, the PTO issues a public
document that precisely and officially fixes the extent of the inven-
tor's property right. The inventor enjoys an exclusive right to
make, use, or sell that invention for 17 (or, under less common
conditions, 14) years. Unless they can demonstrate PTO error in
granting the patent, those who make, use, or sell this invention
without permission face penalties under reasonably predictable
and settled infringement standards.
Patent doctrine, of course, is not serenely unblemished, nor
has it functioned smoothly and without controversy since its incep-
tion. Among the most bedeviling problems is the fundamental rule
that inventors cannot patent "laws of nature. 79 Courts and com-
mentators have yet to offer a satisfactory justification for this basic
A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 Ga L Rev 1221, 1225-30 (1979); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use,
56 U Chi L Rev 1017, 1024 n 27 (1989); Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Prop-
erty, 18 Phil & Pub Aff 31 (1989).
"' See, for example, Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 185 (1981); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 US 127, 130 (1948).
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rule. 0 Another patent controversy is over the correct definition of
nonobviousness81 Particularly since 1982 (when the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit became the primary appellate court
for patent cases), judges have assessed nonobviousness by refer-
ence to so-called secondary considerations. 2 The main secondary
consideration is whether the inventor's device has been a commer-
cial success. Commentators have' repeatedly and persuasively
shown, however, that commercial success is a poor proxy for non-
obviousness.8 3 A witlessly obvious thing can be a hit because of
changing buyer tastes, low cost and price, or effective marketing.
Conversely, a stubbornly elusive solution can flop for all the oppo-
site reasons. I therefore concede that patent, like copyright, has its
share of warts and move on to my central topic: explaining how the
intellectually successful parts of patent doctrine can render aid to
the distresses of copyright law.
1. Originality.
Our patent doctrine requires that inventions be original, in the
sense that applicants lose if "[they] did not [themselves] invent
the subject matter sought to be patented. '84 This requirement
makes sense. It reserves the incentive of an exclusive right to those
who made the research investment and denies the incentive to
thieves. Besides discouraging theft, this precise targeting leaves
unprotected those inventions for which the true inventor did not
apply for a patent, and hence presumably was not motivated by
the prospect of an exclusive right.
2. Novelty.
The patent code also demands that inventions be novel, mean-
ing that applicants lose if "the invention was known or used by
"0 Compare Gordon Tullock, Intellectual Property, in William Kingston, ed, Direct
Protection of Innovation 171, 177 (Kluwer, 1987) ("we should attempt to get new and desir-
able ideas in all fields, not just those of mechanical invention"), with Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 Yale L J 177,
230 (1987) ("Insofar as patent law permits inventors to keep research competitors from us-
ing their discoveries, it could aggravate existing conflict between scientific norms and the
incentives created by scientific rewards."). Eisenberg concludes that a properly specified ex-
perimental use privilege could meliorate the conflict between patent and subsidized aca-
demic research incentives. Id.
"i See, for example, Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for
Patents, 1966 S Ct Rev 293; Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards:
Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Cal L Rev 803 (1988).
Id at 820-21, 823-37.
8' See note 81.
35 USC § 102(f) (1988). See also id at § 115.
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others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publi-
cation in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by
the applicant for patent. ' 85 This requirement of novelty does not
mean that inventors get patents only if they were the very first on
the planet to conceive of their inventions. In 1850 Chief Justice
Taney explained that prior art was relevant only if it had existed
"in a manner accessible to the public. If [a] foreign invention had
been printed or patented, it was already given to the world and
open to the people of this country, as well as of others, upon rea-
sonable inquiry.""" Later cases have refined this duty of "reasona-
ble inquiry" to make inventors responsible for locating all printed
records that are "available to persons interested and [that] could
be located by persons ordinarily skilled in the subject matter with
the exercise of reasonable diligence. 8 7 For instance, courts have
required that an inventor be familiar with a single doctoral thesis
existing in but a single university library, so long as the thesis is
indexed and cataloged according to standard procedures. 88
One might question how effective this requirement is in
prompting those who do industrial research and development to
stop in the library before heading for the laboratory. If the require-
ment is unknown to most inventors, it will fail to exact an ounce of
reading in advance of pounds of original investigation. Yet the ro-
mantic image of a lone, legally unsophisticated inventor in a garage
may be less representative of reality than the corporate research
department that works closely with in-house patent lawyers.
Whatever the facts, patent law would be foolish to excuse inven-
tors from all responsibility for knowing the relevant literature-as
long as one agrees that at least sometimes it is cheaper to read
about past wheels than to reinvent them. This point carries partic-
ular force because the patent system itself catalogs and thus eco-
nomically centralizes a great deal of technological information.
Whether we quarrel or concur with particular novelty decisions,
then, we can generally agree that patent law operates efficiently by
insisting upon novelty.
85 35 USC § 102(a).
"' Gayler v Wilder, 51 US 476, 496 (1850) (emphasis added).
V Phillips Electronic & Pharmaceutical Indus. v Thermal & Electronics Indus., Inc.,
311 F Supp 17, 36 (D NJ 1970).
88 In re Hall, 781 F2d 897, 900 (Fed Cir 1986).
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3. Nonobviousness.
A third patent requirement that makes evident sense is the
comically but accurately named test of nonobviousness. Congress
codified this test more than a century after the Supreme Court in-
vented it. 9 This codification directs that no patent shall issue "if
the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter.., would have
been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains."9 The Supreme Court ex-
plained the rationale for this rule in 1882: "It was never the object
of [the patent] laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device,
every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and
spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the or-
dinary progress of manufactures."'91
This rationale harks back to the patent specter at issue in
Darcy v Allin.92 This 1602 opinion refused to enforce a patent on
playing cards, reasoning that the patent was unnecessary for the
good of the realm because it did not bring any new trade into the
realm.93 If a patent is not necessary to induce an invention, it can
harm consumers. If adequate substitutes are not available, an un-
needed patent causes the price of its subject good to rise from a
competitive cost-based level to a monopolistic one. The patent
gives its owner the power to avoid competition and to charge what
the traffic will bear. Queen Elizabeth injured whist and poker play-
ers by creating an exclusive property right to cover a product that
already existed. So too the Supreme Court simply injures consum-
ers if it permits a patent on a creation that the Court is sure
"would naturally and spontaneously occur . . . in the ordinary
progress of manufactures." Thus the requirement of nonobvious-
ness serves consumers by narrowing the scope of what is patent-
able, weeding out inventions of novel things that nonetheless did
not require the special bait of patent. In short, consumers should
get the best of both worlds from a test of nonobviousness: new
products and processes that would never have existed absent the
special promise of patent, and low prices for the new inventions
that did not need the bait.
" See Historical and Revision Notes to 35 USC § 103 (Patent Act of 1952); Hotchkiss v
Greenwood, 52 US 248 (1850).
90 35 USC § 103.
" Atlantic Works v Brady, 107 US 192, 200 (1882) (emphasis added).
" 11 Coke 84b, 74 Eng Rep 1131, 77 Eng Rep 1260 (QB 1602).
74 Eng Rep at 1136-37, 77 Eng Rep at 1266.
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I do not claim- that patent law actually has produced good so-
cial results. I offer no data to support such a claim. Rather, I argue
that the patent requirements of originality, novelty, and nonobvi-
ousness create a comprehensible and logical set of incentives to in-
duce research and development beneficial to consumers. These pil-
lars of patent law make sense and can help make sense of the
confusions of copyright doctrine.
III. RESOLVING THREE COPYRIGHT PERPLEXITIES
We now possess a sufficient grasp of patent law to take hold of
the answers that have eluded the law of copyright. Reordering the
issues will facilitate exposition.
A. The Appropriate Role for Experts in Copyright Law
Like copyright law, patent law distinguishes the opinion of ex-
perts from the opinion of laypersons. Unlike copyright law, patent
law explains why it does so.
The administration of patent law's nonobviousness require-
ment calls upon expert opinion in a way relevant to copyright doc-
trine.9 4 Obviousness is strictly a matter of opinion. To ask whether
something is obvious is to ask whether that thing fits with a per-
son's expectations or knowledge-an inquiry that depends on that
person's particular expectations or knowledge. Experts' familiarity
with their field makes more of it seem obvious. A layperson, for
instance, would be stumped if asked what had happened when the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to a petition from a
state court holding of state law. Lawyers think it obvious that
nothing of substance had occurred. Any test of obviousness there-
fore must specify the relevant background from which the judg-
ment issues.
The patent code sensibly requires that the issue of obvi-
ousness be judged according to the opinion of an ordinary ex-
pert-that is, "a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
[the invention's] subject matter pertains."9 5 To rely upon a layper-
son's opinion of obviousness would diminish the effectiveness of
the requirement. Laypersons are easily awed by technological mat-
ters unimpressive to those trained in a particular field. The conse-
11 35 USC § 112 (governing by reference to expert opinion the adequacy of patent dis-
closures-an issue made irrelevant in copyright law by the absence of a disclosure
requirement).
-6 35 USC § 103.
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quence would be to allow patents on advances that knowledgeable
persons would recognize as likely to have "naturally and spontane-
ously occur[red] to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordi-
nary progress of manufactures. 9 6 Allowing such patents would
bring consumers higher prices, but no new products or processes.
Patent doctrine also wisely avoids reliance on the views of ex-
pert experts. If federal law granted patents only to technological
advances that impress the Cal Tech faculty, federal law would
grant very few patents indeed. 7 Inventors would lose confidence in
the lure of patent if experience revealed it to be mostly ruse. The
second-order adjustment that is the role of the nonobviousness re-
quirement would cripple patent law's first-order incentive func-
tion-an adjustment akin to making knives safe by removing their
blades.
Thus the patent code makes just the right distinctions be-
tween expert and lay opinion. It liberates as many innovations as it
can from the exclusivity of patent while preserving a trusting state
of mind in our inventing population. Inventors can rest assured
that the law will judge the efforts of creators according to a jury of
their peers. As a result, the incentive remains live enough to moti-
vate investments in creation and demanding enough to reserve the
prize for worthy cases.
This distinction between expert and lay opinion operates only
within the framework of patent law's nonobviousness requirement.
It would be error to conclude from patent law that expert opinion
can play some role in copyright doctrine insulated from other
copyright issues. I thus turn to the copyright issue of originality
before attempting to state the lesson about experts that patent law
would teach to copyright doctrine.
B. Copyright Originality as Conditional Investment, Not Aes-
thetic Achievement
Innovation law aims to prompt the creation of new things. One
might take "new" to signify something that has never before ex-
isted on Earth. Neither patent nor copyright doctrine finds this
definition to be helpful. Patent law demands instead that inven-
tions be new to our recorded public information system. Copyright
96 Atlantic Works, 107 US at 200.
Compare Cuno Engineering Corp. v Automatic Devices Corp., 314 US 84, 91 (1941)
(a new device does not qualify for a patent unless it "reveal[s] the flash of creative genius")
with Reviser's Note to § 103 of Patent Act of 1952 (cited in note 89) (rejecting "flash of
creative genius" test).
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effects its version of this requirement by denying protection to
works of authorship lacking originality. But we have seen that
judges have yet to develop a sensible definition of that require-
ment." This section will argue that patent law implies that copy-
right's originality requirement should demand only that something
be costly to create and unlikely to arise without copyright's
protection.
1. The indirect lesson from patent law.
A direct but simple-minded lesson would be that copyright
should incorporate the patent requirement of novelty or nonobvi-
ousness. Copyright law has considered and wisely rejected such su-
perficial transfers.
On the matter of novelty, Judge Hand in Fred Fisher v Dil-
lingham rejected the proposal that the "rule of the patent law gov-
erning validity is to be carried over into copyrights."9 9 Hand ex-
tended copyright protection to a plaintiff's musical composition
despite the fact that, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the relevant as-
pect of the composition had appeared previously "[i]n a book of
piano exercises by one Landon."'100 In other words, Judge Hand
protected the plaintiff's reinvention. By so doing, he refused to im-
pose a duty of research upon the plaintiff to dig for and unearth
compositions like Landon's.
Judge Hand was astute to confine the duty of library research
to technological inventors and to refuse to extend it to authors of
copyrighted works. We regard it as necessary and desirable that
the process of technological change proceed by self-conscious incre-
mentalism.Ye" Newton, after all, borrowed the claim that he had
seen further because he had stood on the shoulders of giants.102
Our belief in the idea of technological progress thus makes patent
law seem wise to insist that inventors begin technological investi-
gations by reviewing the accomplishments of others. In contrast,
copyright has protected creations for which judicial insistence on
historical research seems inappropriate and misguided.103
" See text at notes 55-73.
298 F 145, 150 (S D NY 1924).
100 Id at 146.
o1 Compare Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 345 (cited in note 72) ("it is possi-
ble to describe an invention compactly and to establish relatively small classes of related
inventions beyond which the searchers need not go"). See text at notes 85-88.
10I See Robert K. Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript (Free
Press, 1965) (tracing the origin of the phrase to the Middle Ages).
"01 See also Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 345 (cited in note 72) ("There are
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It is conventionally desirable for composers to know the litera-
ture, but a judge would seem brazen to assert that excavating mu-
sical artifacts was the most efficient way to compose new music.
Were a judge to require that cartographers begin by reviewing ear-
lier maps rather than by traveling the ground themselves, we
would be right to ask where that judge gained such confidence
about the most efficient method of making maps. And we would
question a judge who ordered that the author striving for the Great
American Novel begin, not with an ambitious pen, but with a li-
brary card and a very large reading assignment. My point is not
that such approaches necessarily are bad. Rather, it is that judges
lack confidence that these methods are the only good ways to pro-
ceed. Different notions about the efficient process for creating dif-
ferent types of innovations thus justify Judge Hand's refusal to
graft onto copyright the patent-seeker's duty to research the na-
tion's available documents.
These notions rest on seat-of-the-pants intuition. But we have
no better information, and judicial decisions cannot await scientific
or quantitative publications on the topic. Lacking data, our best
guess is that copyright is right to reject patent law's novelty
requirement.
Likewise, copyright judges have correctly rejected simple im-
portation of patent law's requirement of nonobviousness. Copy-
right does not aim to stimulate the creation of things that are not
conceptually obvious.104 The facts in Bell (which Judge Frank ig-
nored in relevant part) perfectly illustrate the wisdom of rejecting
the nonobviousness requirement. The district court stressed that
the mezzotint method "is a tedious process requiring skill and pa-
tience and is, therefore, rather expensive compared with modern
color photographic processes"' 0 5 of the sort used by defendant Cat-
alda Company. The district court's wearying account takes hun-
dreds and hundreds of words to explain the details of the process.
After reading about the effort of its creation, one can well be-
lieve that a mezzotint of Pinkie illustrates the public goods prob-
billions of pages of copyrighted material .... [Authors] cannot read all the copyrighted
literature in existence (in all languages, and including unpublished works!) in order to en-
sure that [they have] not accidentally duplicated some copyrighted material.").
10 Bell, 191 F2d at 102 ("The defendants' contention apparently results from the ambi-
guity of the word 'original.' It may mean startling, novel or unusual, a marked departure
from the past. Obviously this is not what is meant when one speaks of 'the original package,'
or the 'original bill'.... [N]othing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter
be strikingly unique or novel.").
'05 74 F Supp at 975. ,
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lem that arises in the absence of copyright property protection.
Bell had to decide whether to invest in a method of creation that
was expensive to undertake and vulnerable to copying by relatively
cheap (but possibly lower-quality) photographic methods. 06 With-
out an assurance of protection against free riders like Catalda, Bell
might never have bothered to mezzotint Pinkie-in which case lov-
ers of old English portraiture would have to forgo their mezzotints
for reproductions of possibly poorer quality or for trips to southern
California to see the original in the Huntington Library. The case
for copyright protection here is classical. That the mezzotint is ob-
vious, in the sense of an unimpressive research insight, is irrele-
vant. Consumers in this situation wanted copyright law to offer
Bell the incentive he needed to make the product they demanded.
Copyright law shrewdly declines obvious as a synonym for original.
Rather, copyright law should look to the more general role the
nonobviousness requirement plays in patent law. Judges ought to
use the originality requirement to allow competitors to get some
inventions for free. The requirement can liberate from copyright
protection (and its consequent high prices) creations so easy to
make that they do not require its special bait of exclusive property
protection. Courts would thereby reserve copyright's exclusivity to
cases that demand it, giving consumers the benefit of competitive
prices in cases that do not.
Copyright courts, then, should define as original any work
whose creation requires enough effort to deter the creative act ab-
sent the copyright's exclusive promise. It is not essential that effort
be incurred in terms of actual dollars. Bell apparently contracted
with others for the mezzotints, but nothing should change if he
himself had done the work in his spare time and on borrowed
equipment. The crucial question remains the same: Is the creation
easy enough that considerations other than copyright protection
suffice to motivate it, or is copyright's incentive a decisive condi-
tion of the creator's investment? If the former, then courts can de-
clare open season on the work of authorship without imperilling
the future supply of such new creations, thus giving consumers low
prices from copiers. If the latter, then judges err to leave Bell's
work open to Catalda's free-riding because they impair the incen-
106 Bell, 74 F Supp at 975. Compare 74 F Supp at 977 ("Of course, the defendants could
have gone directly to the old masters and photographed them, but this would have involved
the transportation of the photographic equipment, obtaining permission from the galleries,
and in some cases, entry into enemy territory in time of war, not then possible.").
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tive of future art reproducers to create the copies that consumers
demand.
2. Allocating the burden of proof.
The proposal thus is to define "original" as "requiring an in-
vestment in creation that would not occur without copyright pro-
tection." This proposal orients the law to its objective but reduces
the ultimate issue to state of mind, raising difficult issues of proof.
Courts will rarely have access to reliable evidence about a particu-
lar author's subjective willingness to create without copyright pro-
tection. Well-represented plaintiffs will hold opinions that are both
favorable to their own cases and difficult for defendants to test di-
rectly. Subjective inquiry thus promises no easy resolution of the
issue that the patent analogy makes material.
In general, patent law responds to this evidentiary problem by
seeking evidence from the creator's peers, and copyright law
should adopt the same approach. When defendants claim that the
plaintiff's work is not original, copyright law should look for evi-
dence of the probable attitudes of persons having ordinary skill in
the art to which the subject matter pertains. 10 7 It should ask for
proof about whether these ordinary experts believe that copyright
protection would have been superfluous to them, had they consid-
ered attempting the work of authorship at issue. If copyright
would have been superfluous, then judges ought to withhold copy-
right protection from the plaintiff's work on the ground that it is
insufficiently original. Alternatively, if they would have created
only with copyright protection, judges ought to declare the subject
matter original enough for copyright law-even if it is aesthetically
jejune or contains no substantial variation.
The most pressing matter is to allocate correctly the burden of
proof. When courts wonder whether copyright protection is impor-
tant to assure the creation of works of the kind at issue, many fac-
tors can become relevant. Authors might create for a host of other
and sufficient reasons. 10 8 A common belief is that artists create
solely because their genius drives them to it, but this explanation
seems hopelessly romantic. Who can say that even Mozart, who
sometimes composed furiously for patrons without any prospect of
copyright protection, would not have written even more had the
return been higher? Or perhaps extra income from copyright royal-
ties would have eased his circumstances, leading him to golf in-
107 Compare text at note 95.
108 See generally Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 329-33 (cited in note 72).
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stead of his Requiem. The case of the driven genius immune to
financial incentives seems too speculative to treat it as the norm
for creation of works of authorship. A safer stance is to assume
that creators are generally interested in cash and respond to its
lure, perhaps leaving the door open for a contrary showing in the
unusual case.
A different and more substantial alternative incentive is the
lead-time or first-mover advantage. This idea supposes that copy-
right incentives are icing; the cake is the financial benefit of beat-
ing competitors to market and enjoying a period of monopoly not
legally enforced but nonetheless inevitable, alluring, and sufficient.
By itself, the prospect of being first to market can induce people to
create many innovations-like new industrial and furniture de-
signs, for which exclusive protection usually is unavailable. 10 9
Creators might also receive support from sources other than
the exclusivity of a property right, as do university scholars whose
research and publication receives direct public funding and as do
authors directly employed by the federal government. 110 Or free
riders may be unable to duplicate a level of quality that the plain-
tiff's customers believe is decisive. It may have been, for example,
that Catalda's photographic copies could never have captured
Bell's mezzotint preservation of "the softness of line which is char-
acteristic of the oil painting.""' Were a court confident that the
quality of Bell's prints sufficed to assure him a market against Cat-
alda's inferior photographic copies, that court could conclude that
copyright protection was a superfluous incentive. These factors all
depart from a literal definition for the word "original," but all are
relevant to its definition as "requiring a conditional investment."
Courts should be modest, however, about their ability to sec-
ond-guess an author's willingness to create without the promise of
copyright. If judges review authors' motivation too aggressively, fu-
ture authors may come to believe that the myopic hindsight of a
judge will render their needed copyright protection risky or un-
likely. The basic purpose of copyright is to provide an incentive;
the originality doctrine provides a second-order correction. An
overly aggressive second-order correction may well damage the
lo9 See, for example, Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L Rev
1341 (1987).
1o Compare 17 USC § 105 (no copyright protection for works of the United States
Government).
" Bell, 74 F Supp at 975. See also text at note 58; Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud
at 329 (cited in note 72).
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first-order policy that it seeks to perfect. It can be a poor bargain
for consumers to gain lower prices on existing goods at the cost of
losing future new ones.
Any defendant claiming that the plaintiff's work is unoriginal
therefore should be required to prove that persons having ordinary
skill in the art believe they would have produced work like the
plaintiff's without the incentive of copyright protection. Where the
defendant cannot muster the usual preponderance of the evidence
on the issue, courts should presume that the plaintiff's work is in-
deed original and thus covered by copyright. This allocation of the
burden of proof would assure future authors that the fate of their
property rights lies with a jury of their peers rather than with hy-
percritical judges.
3. Defining the relevant evidence.
Having stated the relevant issue and allocated the burden of
proof, it might seem appropriate simply to declare that the re-
maining issue is a factual question to be resolved by a battle of
competing experts. In this battle, the experts would testify
whether copyright would have been a necessary incentive to induce
their own creation of the work at issue. This ultimate proof will be
necessary to resolve some cases. But it is often possible to avoid
this expensive and protracted process, for judicial common sense
can resolve many cases short of trial. Consider four illustrations.
a) Painstaking reproductions. Bell v Catalda reached the
right result for consumers, although not for any reason that Judge
Frank gave. As the district court described it, the mezzotint pro-
cess does not seem so easy that a court could be confident that
future parties in Bell's position would create mezzotints without
the prospect of copyright. Even without expert opinion, the court's
conclusion that the mezzotints were original therefore seems en-
tirely correct. The same evaluation logically extends to any art re-
production of an extremely painstaking nature, whether or not the
reproduction contains variations." 2
b) Incidental by-products. The creation at issue in Toro
Co. v R & R Products Co."' was a numbering system for replace-
ment parts. This work flunked the originality test, again without
"' Compare Alva Studios, Inc. v Winninger, 177 F Supp 265 (S D NY 1959) (uphold-
ing copyright on reduced-scale, museum-quality copies of Rodin's sculpture Hand of God).
113 787 F2d 1208 (8th Cir 1986).
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recourse to expert opinion. The court concluded that "[t]he arbi-
trary assignment of randomly chosen numbers to a particular re-
placement part does not evince enough authorship for copyright
protection."' 14 A judge untutored by experts could be confident
that the absence of copyright protection would not diminish the
number of such systems created in the future. It is likely that peo-
ple create such systems incidentally, as an easily made by-product
of a manufacturing enterprise. Without fear of losing such future
creation, the Toro court thus was right to conclude that the parts
numbering system was insufficiently original for copyright protec-
tion. In liberating this work of authorship for use by rivals, the
court served consumers by allowing free riding that reduced their
costs without any threat of lost future innovation." 5
c) Unpublished correspondence. The same analysis and
conclusion apply to a third, more significant general category of
works: personal correspondence. The ancient dogma is that copy-
right law gives authors the power to stop others from verbatim
copying of the contents of ordinary letters, even though the author
gives the physical paper away to the letter's recipient. 116 This rule
has caused no end of confusion about the fair use of the correspon-
dence that courts will allow to free riders.117 Next to the idea/ex-
pression doctrine, fair use is the most important copyright defense.
Under certain circumstances it entitles free riders to copy a pro-
tected text without liability. In a vague way, the statute codifies
the vague cases that set forth this defense." 8 Including letters
within copyright protection consigns the freedom of historians and
biographers to quote their subjects to the uncertain contours of
" Id at 1216.
Compare Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition,
and Compatibility, 75 Am Econ Rev 424 (1985) (consumers benefit from permitting wide-
spread use of products for which the user's utility increases with the number of other agents
consuming the good).
" See, for example, Brown and Denicola, Cases on Copyright at 14 (cited in note 13)
(citing Sir James Stephens, Digest on the Law of Copyright, annexed to the Report of the
Royal Commission on Copyright, 1878, Cmd 2036, lxv); id at 15 (citing Baker v Libbie, 210
Mass 599, 97 NE 109 (1912)).
.1 See, for example, Salinger v Random House, Inc., 811 F2d 90 (2d Cir 1987) (biogra-
pher of J.D. Salinger barred from using excerpts of Salinger letters on public display in
libraries); New Era Publications International, ApS v Henry Holt & Co., 873 F2d 576 (2d
Cir 1989) (biographer of L. Ron Hubbard encounters same analysis, but use allowed because
plaintiff was guilty of laches).
18 See 17 USC § 107; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101
Harv L Rev 1659 (1988).
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fair use. The doctrine thus has churned an earnest debate about
the proper scope of the fair use of letters. 119
The reasoning of this Article suggests that courts should in-
stead reconsider the hoary premise that copyright covers letters in
the first place. Common sense tells us that copyright normally is
irrelevant to people's decisions to write letters to each other. We
can tell that hope of future publication royalties does not affect the
decision to grasp" the pen in these cases because authors willingly
mail their only copy away to an unknown fate. 20 Nor can copy-
right be justified by the argument that authors write more freely
when secure in the knowledge that copyright will keep their
thoughts secret. Copyright never has done such a thing. Even
though copyright law has said that it covers letters, it has simulta-
neously maintained that others remain free to paraphrase the let-
ters' substance.' And copyright never has protected an author by
barring the possessor of a letter from showing the original to those
it wounds or embarrasses the most.'22 In a case where we thus can
be sure that the incentive of copyright is generally irrelevant to the
decision to create, we ought to dispense with copyright as
superfluous.
The conclusion that copyright ought not cover letters perhaps
deserves two exceptions, at least in theory. First, some unusual au-
thors might indeed have kept copies of all their letters with an eye
towards future publication. Such plaintiffs might wish to try to
document that copyright did offer a crucial incentive in their par-
ticular cases. The courts could permit such exceptional showings in
such exceptional cases. Second, as of the 1980s, more people have
begun to write their correspondence on computers with ever larger
storage disks, casting doubt on the presumption that mailing the
envelope signals an author's willingness to surrender control of
personal correspondence. These cases, however, remain exceptions
and do not support current copyright doctrine's initial protection
119 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv L Rev 1105 (1990) (district
judge reversed by Second Circuit in Salinger and New Era continues debate); Weinreb, 103
Harv L Rev 1137 (cited in note 73) (offering competing analysis).
110 Robert Boyd first showed me this logic.
" 17 USC § 102(b); see also cases cited in note 117.
See 17 USC §§ 106(5), 101 (copyright gives a right to control only public display, the
statutory definition of which includes the involvement of "a place open to the public" or "a
substantial number of persons"). Compare Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv L Rev 193, 205 (1890) (famous survey of copyright leading to
purported discovery of a general common law right "to be let alone"), with James H. Bar-
ron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy: Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13
Suffolk U L Rev 875, 907-21 (1979) (Warren and Brandeis's non-copyright tort of public
disclosure of private facts notable today primarily for its insignificance).
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of all correspondence, whatever the date or circumstances of its
origin.
d) Sizable creative investment. This definition of origi-
nality also suggests criticisms of the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Gracen.12 ' That court gave reason for concern that its denial of
copyright protection would lead to reductions in future innovation.
The defendant's actions suggested that the plaintiff's work had
been difficult to create. For example, Bradford Exchange's resort
to a contest to obtain an image evocative of'The Wizard of Oz
implied that the plate was harder to paint than one might imagine.
The contest enticement might have made copyright protection re-
dundant, but there is no reason to believe that it necessarily did
so. One might also argue that the holding will have no effect on
future output because the lack of originality was only an alterna-
tive holding,"" or because the isolated holding will remain un-
known to the relevant creative community. But the government
plays a risky game with creators when it offers them the bait of
copyright generally but hopes they do not notice when it reneges in
individual cases. In short, Gracen evidently did make a sizable cre-
ative investment, and judicial common sense offers no ground for
supposing that she would have done so had she known that copy-
right would not protect it. Gracen thus seems to disserve the inter-
ests of consumers by reducing the future enticement for producers
to create costly renditions of popular culture. The conclusion does
not depend on some resolution of clashing expert opinion.
These four illustrations show that to define "original" as "re-
quiring a conditional investment" does not make trial inevitable.
By suggesting changes in case outcome as well as rationale, two of
the examples also illustrate the practical potential of the proposal
at issue. In some cases, however, defendants would be able to offer
expert evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of original-
ity. In these cases defendants would create a genuine dispute about
the material issue of whether those with ordinary skill in the art
indeed believe that the incentive of copyright protection would
have been unnecessary to induce their own production of the
plaintiff's work of authorship.
Experts never solve everything. Nonetheless, on balance the
23 See text at notes 67-73.
124 Gracen, 698 F2d at 303-04.
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use of expert testimony remains a sensible way for courts to re-
solve the question of originality. One problem, however, is the risk
of error in judging the plaintiff's motivation by relying on others'
opinions, expert or not. This problem is more apparent than real.
An incentive theory of copyright emphasizes ex ante stimuli. When
the aim is to maintain the trust of the creative community, the
analysis appropriately focuses on the typical future author and not
on the possible idiosyncrasies of the plaintiff.
Another problem is deciding who is an expert. In easy cases,
the relevant creator will have no special expertise at all. Layper-
sons will then be able to evaluate the incentive question them-
selves. 115 More typically, however, the issue will force courts to
ponder who in the future will regard the plaintiff as like them-
selves. This question inevitably will turn on the particulars of the
case at hand. Similarly, experts predictably disagree when the law-
yers choose them. The appropriate response to this problem is not
to abandon the use of experts altogether, but to ensure the correct
allocation of the burden of proof.
Suppose a copier claims that Mickey Mouse deserves no copy-
right protection because Walt Disney first drew him in seconds
flat. If we had truly reliable evidence that Walt Disney was a rich
and compulsive genius who would have drawn and published as
many good cartoon characters with copyright protection as with-
out, then consumers really would benefit from a legal declaration
that his creations were free for others to take. But trusty evidence
on this score is nearly impossible to imagine, let alone find. Speed
does not an easy creation make. Years of training and false starts
may be the prerequisite for a brilliant burst of creativity. The best
course is to presume that creators rely on the prospect of copyright
royalties, but leave the matter open to challenge by a defendant
who may care to investigate by asking those with ordinary skill in
the art. I cannot draw even a respectable happy face, but I would
be surprised if experts generally believed that consumers would get
just as many cartoon characters without the bait of copyright as
with it. 126 This method yields no determinate answer, just a sensi-
ble question to ask and a sensible method of investigation.
In attempting to define what counts as original, copyright law
has wound itself into a tangle. Patent law offers the knife for the
knot: the understanding that patent law's nonobviousness require-
125 Compare text at notes 112-15, 123-24.
I" Compare Walt Disney Productions v The Air Pirates, 581 F2d 751 (9th Cir 1978)
(Mickey protected).
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ment uses experts to identify cases where withdrawing protection
does not impair incentives to create. Copyright law ought to imi-
tate this sensible policy by asking judges similarly to identify
works that are so easy or routine to create that they would arise
without the need for copyright protection. Unless they can be sure
that copyright's incentive is unnecessary, however, courts serve
consumers best by preserving the copyright prize.
C. Conditional Creation, Not Idea and Expression
Under the doctrine of the dichotomy of idea and expression,
defendants enjoy a legal right to copy a plaintiff's idea but are in-
fringers if they take the expression. All will agree that the publicly
available idea is some more general version of the privately owned
expression. The problem is how much more general. Current doc-
trine offers us no method, even in principle, to provide this critical
answer. This section 'proposes such a method. The first step is to
abandon as misleading any concern with the literal meanings of
idea and expression and instead to turn again to patent law for a
functional touchstone. Patent law accomplishes the same function
as does the law of idea and expression, although through a differ-
ent bureaucratic procedure. This section surveys the fields' rele-
vant similarities and differences to develop a method for generat-
ing conclusions as to whether a taking is idea or expression.
The proposed method requires courts to compare the parties'
works in order to define as precisely as possible the thing the de-
fendant took from the plaintiff. The court should then evaluate
that thing: Was it original to the plaintiff, or did the plaintiff in-
stead borrow that thing from preexisting cultural tradition familiar
to those in the field? The plaintiff should win in the former case,
but not in the latter. The method demonstrates that Nichols and
Sheldon were rightly decided. This section concludes by applying
the method to two sample copyright problems: systems and
processes, and fact works.
1. A patent examiner's view of idea and expression.
Patent doctrine compels creators to define their innovation
precisely when applying for a property right. This application,
once approved by the Patent and Trademark Office, becomes the
patent itself. It begins with a description of the invention and ends
with a section stating, "I claim . . . ." These final patent claims,
like the metes and bounds of a land claim, mark off precisely what
the inventor owns.
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The claims are not underinclusive. Inventors surrender to the
public any aspect of their invention that they fail to appropriate in
the claims. This awful prospect induces inventors (and lawyers
who fear malpractice liability) to write claims that include every
original, new, and nonobvious feature of the invention. Neither are
patent claims overinclusive. The PTO checks and certifies that
fact. The agency assigns each patent application to a specialist in
the relevant technology, such as mechanical, electrical, or chemical
engineering. This patent examiner's job is to compare the applica-
tion with the prior art to ensure that the claims do not appropriate
anything that already existed or that would be obvious to an ordi-
nary expert in light of the prior art. The examination process may
take years12 7 and usually requires several rounds of negotiation be-
tween the examiner and the applicant. The process ends when the
examiner either rejects the application altogether or approves a fi-
nal version of the claims as free from the error of overinclusion.
Assessments differ as to the quality of this bureaucratic re-
view. No one doubts, however, that the process is supposed to pro-
duce a reliable document that defines with great exactness the
thing to which the inventor has exclusive rights. Inventors then
can enforce the rights this document promises by suing for
infringement.
In sharp contrast, copyright law hands out rights without any
similar inspection of the work or any definition at all of the cre-
ators' particular rights. Its protection is almost mystically auto-
matic; even without need for an application, it springs into exist-
ence as soon as the work is "fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression. '118 A drawback offsets this procedure's Doric simplicity:
no one really knows what it means. One can petition the Copyright
Office to register a copyright, but acceptance by the Registrar of
Copyright is perfunctory, except for some particular classes of
works where the Copyright Office has promulgated a policy against
recognizing copyright. In a usual case-say, a novel-one would
not expect the Registrar of Copyright even to crack the volume,
much less to read and evaluate it. Not until authors conclude a suit
for copyright infringement does any government official give them
1M See, for example, Edmund L. Andrews, Long Delays Seen in Patents for Genetic
Engineering, NY Times D1 (July 19, 1990) ("[C]ompanies must wait an average of four
years to obtain a patent in genetic engineering .... For all other aspects of biotechnology
• . .the delay averages three years. By comparison, the waiting period for all types of pat-
ents is only 18 months.").
"1" 17 USC § 102(a).
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a bill of particulars about their rights. The government official
then is a federal judge, and the detailing of rights proceeds under
the banner of the idea/expression dichotomy.
By ignoring what judges say about the abstractions test or the
merger doctrine and instead concentrating on functional resem-
blance to the patent model, it is possible to give useful analytical
structure to the confusion of ideas and expressions. The key is to
realize that the idea/expression dichotomy provides the mechanism
for copyright to provide what patent does: specification of the
metes and bounds of the creator's rights. Copyright accomplishes
this same function in a different procedural context and to a more
modest extent, for reasons that Part IV will examine. For now, I
simply accept the fact of these procedural differences, and observe
that patent examiners-seek to ensure that patent claims represent
a globally accurate statement of the extent and limits of inventors'
achievements. In contrast, a court overseeing a copyright case aims
to decide a contest between only the two parties before it.
The issue of idea and expression arises only if the judge de-
cides (or assumes arguendo) that the defendant indeed has copied
from the plaintiff's work. Defendants who have obtained their text
elsewhere or through independent creation win-period. We have
seen that copyright law imposes on defendants no duty to research
the nation's recorded literature.12 Because proof of independent
creation is a complete defense, assume for purposes of the follow-
ing discussion that the defendant indeed has copied something
from the plaintiff.
We can appreciate the way in which the idea/expression doc-
trine mimics patent law if we abandon our concern about the lit-
eral definition of these words and instead adopt a two-step analy-
sis. The first step is for the court to define as specifically as
possible the thing that the defendant has taken from the plaintiff.
Competent counsel should be of great assistance, but this step in-
evitably imposes a tedious burden on the court. It must lay the
plaintiff's text next to the defendant's and study both until each is
familiar ground. The court then must write down the most detailed
description possible of the features that the defendant took from
the plaintiff.
Having thus defined the thing that the defendant took, the
second step is to decide whether that thing is original to the plain-
tiff, employing the definition developed in the preceding section.
129 See text at notes 99-103.
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That is, to get' that thing the defendant took, did the plaintiff in-
vest costly creative effort that presumptively relied on the promise
of copyright? If so, judgment properly goes to the plaintiff, be-
cause, in conclusory terms, the defendant has taken the plaintiff's
expression. Or did the plaintiff get that thing by copying it effort-
lessly from existing and available sources, or by otherwise respond-
ing entirely to incentives other than copyright? If so, judgment
properly goes to the defendant because, again stating it in con-
clusory terms, the defendant took only the plaintiff's idea.
The classic opinions of Nichols and Sheldon illustrate these
steps and provide a crucial qualification. Judge Hand wrote neither
decision according to this outline, but careful attention to his lan-
guage and logic reveals that both embodied the essence of the
method.
2. The example of Nichols.
Judge Hand started his opinion in Nichols by defining as spe-
cifically as possible what the defendant took from the plaintiff. He
compared Nichols's play Abie's Irish Rose with Universal's movie
The Cohens and the Kellys and concluded that Universal had
taken two things from Nichols: characters and plot. Beginning with
the characters, this comparison permitted Judge Hand to specify
at what level of abstraction Universal copied Nichols's work:
There are but four characters common to both plays, the lov-
ers and the fathers. The lovers are so faintly indicated as to
be no more than stage properties. They are loving and fertile;
that is really all that can be said of them, and anyone else is
quite within his rights if he puts loving and fertile lovers in a
play of his own, wherever he gets the cue. 130
This passage identifies the level of Universal's taking: "loving and
fertile lovers." By using this concise and revealing phrase, Judge
Hand in effect concludes that, at this level of abstraction, Nichols
had borrowed these "stage properties" from tradition rather than
creating them herself.
Judge Hand similarly compared Nichols's and Universal's ren-
ditions of the Jewish and the Irish fathers to determine precisely
what Universal took of them from Nichols. After mentioning the
dissimilarities, the judge summarized and evaluated the features
they shared:
"' 45 F2d at 122 (emphasis added).
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Both [Nichols's and Universal's Jewish fathers] are grotesque,
extravagant, and quarrelsome; both are fond of display; but
these common qualities make up only a small part of their
simple pictures, no more than any one might lift if he
chose. . . . [The defendant's Irish father does not share the
plaintiff's religious fanaticism and patriarchal pride.] For the
rest [the defendant's Irish father] is only a grotesque hobble-
dehoy, used for low comedy of the most conventional sort,
which any one might borrow, if he chanced not to know the
exemplar.131
Again Judge Hand concluded that Nichols was claiming an ex-
clusive right for something that she had obtained by copying tradi-
tion rather than by creating through personal investment. The
judge's essential decision was that, at the level of Universal's tak-
ing, Nichols's characters were stereotypes rather than original
creations:
It is indeed scarcely credible that [Nichols] should not have
been aware of those stock figures, the low comedy Jew and
Irishman. The defendant has not taken from her more than
their prototypes have contained for many decades. If so, ob-
viously so to generalize her copyright, would allow her to
cover what was not original with her.132
Judge Hand offered a similar analysis of Universal's use of
Nichols' plot:
The only matter common to the two is a quarrel between a
Jewish and an Irish father, the marriage of their children, the
birth of grandchildren and a reconciliation.
If the defendant took so much from the plaintiff, it may
well have been because her amazing success seemed to prove
that this was a subject of enduring popularity.
A comedy based on the conflicts between Irish and Jews,
into which the marriage of their children enters, is no more
susceptible of copyright than the outline of Romeo and
Juliet. 3 3
For the first time in the years that she had owned the copy-
right on her successful play, Nichols finally got some authoritative
Id (emphasis added).
132 Id (emphasis added).
133 Id.
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official to give her what patent owners get from the start: a useful
definition of what she owned. Judge Hand gave the crucial details,
but not in the way a patent states a global definition of the crea-
tor's achievement. His analysis resolved the contest only at the
level of Universal's taking. Assessed at that level, Hand decided
that Nichols herself was a borrower rather than a creator. Nichols
had not made the things she sought to claim. Just as patent exam-
iners disserve consumers if they grant rights to things that are not
new, so too federal judges would achieve only consumer harm by
extending copyright to a traditional portrayal of tired stereotypes.
The analysis from patent law thus describes Judge Hand's
treatment of the Nichols case.' Nichols does, however, present a
further complexity. Judge Hand made plain his confidence that, at
the level at which Universal took them, Nichols's plot and charac-
ters were not new. He also repeatedly stated his suspicion that
Nichols knew of this prior art and had borrowed it rather than
inventing it herself. Yet Judge Hand did not deign to document his
claims, such as the one he made about what the characters' "proto-
types have contained for many decades." Indeed, he went so far as
to assume the contrary: that Nichols had "devised her figures out
of her brain de novo." 135 These points seem to undermine the con-
gruence of Hand's decision with the analysis from patent law that I
present. If we accept two points, however, Judge Hand was right to
rule against Nichols without specific proof either that her charac-
ters and plot-at the level at which Universal took them-were
old, or that Nichols indeed had not created these things herself.
First, Judge Hand evidently regarded himself as "a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter per-
tains."' 36 Unlike many federal judges, Hand was at ease in declar-
ing a type of plot to be of "enduring popularity." He was not shy
about concluding that literary characters were "stock figures" or
"stage properties," and that these characters had qualities that
were "common," that other literary works "have contained for
many decades," and for which other works have provided "the ex-
emplar." Later, in Sheldon, Judge Hand would comment on the
divergence of a plot from "the classic canon of tragedy"; would
judge one plot device to be "the same dramatic trick" as another;
and would dismiss the studio's interpretation of its own plot detail
134 See also Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 349-50 (cited in note 72) (setting
forth an analysis similar to that of Nichols).
135 45 F2d at 122.
136 See text at note 107.
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on the ground that this account would imply "an impossible de-
nou[e]ment on the screen for the heroine ....,, These confident
judgments bespeak both familiarity with literary tradition and the
judge's faith in his own powers of literary analysis. By no accident
is the very prose of the opinion cultured and mannered through-
out. His style and self-confidence have impressed generations of
readers, 13 8 even though his stated reasoning was nearly free of con-
tent. Judge Hand trusted his literary faculties to the point of de-
crying rather than embracing the assistance that other experts
would offer him.
Second, Hand charged Nichols with a level of expertise equal
to his own, whether or not she actually held it. He openly sus-
pected that she was familiar with the same literary tradition, yet
held that nothing would change even if she were not. This posture
was sensible and consistent, as Judge Hand claimed in Nichols,
with his earlier opinion in Dillingham.139 Patent law's novelty re-
quirement holds inventors responsible for recorded but obscure
knowledge available only through careful library research. 40 In
Dillingham, Hand refused to impose this duty of library research
on authors as a condition of their valid copyright.14 ' Dillingham's
wise refusal does not mean, however, that copyright judges must
suppose that authors know nothing of their profession. To so sup-
pose would leave authors the power to claim rights over familiar
and traditional material that they incorporate in their works, sim-
ply by denying that they knew the material was familiar. It is diffi-
cult to dispute a denial of subjective awareness. Usually only the
author can say what is and is not in that author's head. Judge
Hand thus was right to make nothing turn on Nichols's subjective
knowledge and, in effect, to look instead to what a person of ordi-
nary skill in the art would know without the benefit of library
research.
The Nichols decision thus illustrates the guidance that patent
law offers out of the morass of idea and expression; it also offers
sensible instruction on the level of knowledge that copyright courts
ought to ascribe to authors. Judge Hand's later Sheldon opinion
does the same.
137 Sheldon, 81 F2d at 55.
"3 See note 13.
139 Nichols, 45 F2d at 122 ("Neither my brothers nor I wish to throw doubt upon the
doctrine of that case [Fisher v Dillingham], but it is not applicable here.").
'o See text at notes 85-88.
1 Dillingham, 298 F at 150. See text at note 99.
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3. The example of Sheldon.
Sheldon arose because playwrights claimed that Metro-Gold-
wyn's movie Letty Lynton infringed their earlier play Dishonored
Lady. Patent law suggests that a copyright court should first com-
pare the two works at issue in order to define the precise thing that
the defendant took from the plaintiff author. Judge Hand did that
in Sheldon. Patent law suggests that a copyright court should then
inquire about the origin of the precise thing the defendant took, to
decide whether the plaintiff had laboriously created it or instead
had effortlessly copied it from preexisting sources. Judge Hand
also performed this analysis in Sheldon. He concluded that Metro-
Goldwyn had infringed Sheldon's copyright, the opposite result
from Nichols but an entirely consistent treatment of crucially dif-
ferent facts. As in Nichols, the Sheldon opinion did not expressly
identify or follow these steps, so one must scout their tracks with
care.
Of the two steps, the first is easier to see in Sheldon. The task
of defining the exact thing that Metro-Goldwyn took from plaintiff
Sheldon was complex. There were four relevant texts. Preceding,
and thus conceivably inspiring, the Metro-Goldwyn movie were not
only Sheldon's play, but also an account of a factual episode from
the mid-nineteenth century and, sparked by this history, a novel
by a writer named Lowndes. 142 All four stories variously recounted
a young woman's affair with one man and later engagement to an-
other, followed by an unsuccessful criminal prosecution of her
poisoning of the persistent and threatening first suitor. Judge
Hand detailed the ways in which the character of the film's protag-
onist followed that of the play's and differed from the characters in
the historical account and Lowndes's novel. He did the same for
three key scenes common to the play and film. When he was done,
he had written four densely packed paragraphs that precisely
stated the thing that the filmmakers had taken from the play-
wrights. 43 The very detail necessary to his account suggests that
the filmmakers had taken from Sheldon something of complex
originality rather than, as in Nichols, something simple and
familiar.
The second step renders just this judgment of originality. The
opinion contains decisive evidence to support Judge Hand's finding
that the plaintiffs had created from scratch, not copied from tradi-
"I Sheldon, 81 F2d at 49.
143 Id at 54-55.
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tion. Some of Judge Hand's evidence was specific. The judge ob-
served that the playwrights took only "the merest skeleton" from
the historical tale, and that they built for themselves "[t]he inci-
dents, the characters, the mis en scene, [and] the sequence of
events .... -"I4 Regarding the specific character of their protago-
nist, the judge demonstrated that the playwrights created features
that neither the historical event nor Lowndes's novel contained,
and that the filmmakers had taken those features. 145 He also re-
counted that in the film "the threat scene is carried out with al-
most exactly the same sequence of event and actuation [as in the
play]; it has no prototype in either story or novel." '46
Beyond these specifics, Judge Hand reinforced the conclusion
of originality with statements of a revealingly general character.
Judge Hand commented that "[b]orrowed the work must indeed
not be, for a plagiarist is not himself pro tanto an 'author' ..... ,,4
The presence of this statement in a ruling for Sheldon implies a
premise on the part of the court that plaintiff Sheldon indeed had
not borrowed, an attitude generally consistent with the court's
treatment of the specifics of the two works.
More tellingly, Judge Hand announced that Metro-Goldwyn
had "filled the record with earlier instances of the same dramatic
incidents and devices," but he airily dismissed these earlier works
as irrelevant because "the plaintiffs did not use" them. 4 ' This cas-
ual conclusion is crucial to the patent perspective on the case.
From the patent perspective, Judge Hand's conclusion is mysteri-
ous; the judge never explained how he knew that Sheldon and co-
authors had created independently.
Yet this lack of explanation is also telling; it suggests that
Judge Hand once again must have thought the matter obvious.
Judge Hand apparently considered Metro-Goldwyn's "earlier in-
stances" to be like Landon's obscure book of piano exercises, 4 a
library find beyond the knowledge of an ordinary expert in the
field of scriptwriting and thus not something a judge can expect
144 Id at 50.
145 Id at 55 ("Neither Madeleine Smith, nor the Letty of the novel, were at all like that
148 Id (emphasis added).
147 Id at 54.
148 Id at 53 ("We are to remember that it makes no difference how far the [plaintiffs']
play was anticipated by works in the public demense which the plaintiffs did not use. The
defendants appear not to recognize this, for they have filled the record with earlier instances
of the same dramatic incidents and devices, as though, like a patent, a copyrighted work
must be not only original, but new.") (emphasis added).
149 See text at note 100.
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everyone in the discipline to know. He apparently thought these
"earlier instances" differed decisively from Nichols's "stage
properties" and "stock figures," which he regarded as familiar tra-
dition. He felt comfortable making this classification, without con-
sulting experts in the field, but after silent introspection. In short,
this breezy conclusion provides evidence that Judge Hand acted as
though he himself were a literary expert. For Metro-Goldwyn's
sake, we should hope that Judge Hand was indeed the expert he
evidently thought himself to be. Federal judges lacking Judge
Hand's self-assurance will wish for more evidence and certainly
more discussion on the vital matter of whether the plaintiffs cre-
ated or copied the thing that the defendant took from them.
In both Nichols and Sheldon, Judge Hand functioned like a
patent examiner concerned about consumer welfare. Creators had
claimed that free riders copied their intellectual property. Judge
Hand responded by investigating whether the supposed creators
had invested much to create the thing the copiers had taken. The
first step was to define the thing; the second was to assay its origi-
nality. In Nichols, this analysis showed that the plaintiff herself
was a cultural free rider rather than one who had invested original
creative effort. The court appropriately refused to grant copyright
protection, for authors do not need copyright to induce them to
copy a well-known plot or simply to reuse someone else's familiar
character. It is so easy. In such cases, copyright's exclusivity can
only reduce consumer access to old products; it cannot spur the
creation of truly new ones.
In contrast, the same analysis of the Sheldon case showed that
the plaintiffs had built with their own hands the thing that the
defendants took. Had the court failed to protect this thing, the
prospect of unmitigated free-riding might well have deterred fu-
ture authors from undertaking costly creative efforts. Consumers
thus should approve of both results, even though they go to oppo-
site parties on superficially similar facts.
As discussed above, even if the plaintiff did create the thing
that the defendant took, one must still inquire whether the plain-
tiff would have done so without copyright protection. 150 If copy-
right is superfluous to creation, consumers benefit from withhold-
ing that legal exclusivity-from even a genuine originator. This
concern remains relevant here. Judge Hand properly gave little at-
tention to this larger concern. I have already argued that courts
150 See text at notes 106-08.
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ought to begin with a presumption that copyright is a necessary
incentive to prompt any creation that is expensive.'' Judge Hand
did not second-guess the plaintiffs' willingness to create. 152 The en-
terprise is hazardous-absent proof by Metro-Goldwyn that Shel-
don would have written Dishonored Lady even without the prom-
ise of copyright protection.
Nichols and Sheldon illustrate the general analysis that pat-
ent law implies for copyright. Nothing limits the use of this general
analysis to dramatic works for the stage. It applies whenever the
-idea/expression doctrine does. We thus have a tool of tremendous
use across a great range of copyright problems, from compilations
to computers. I limit my illustrations to two decisions more aggres-
give than Judge Hand's in second-guessing the need for the copy-
right incentive.
4. Judicial willingness to second-guess the need for the copy-
right incentive: Patentable systems and processes.
For more than a century, judges have been denying copyright
protection to systems and processes. Usually judges couch these
denials in the unhelpful terms of idea and expression. Possession
of a tractable method for defining ideas and expressions, however,
permits one to excavate these holdings in search of the policy judg-
ment concealed by the metaphysics. This concealed policy judg-
ment is that the creation of new systems and processes is the sort
of innovation that benefits from initial library research. Therefore
patent protection is appropriate, and patent protection suffices as
a production incentive, independent of copyright. Copyright courts
thus sensibly have denied copyright protection to the creation of
new systems and processes, assigning the problem instead to the
PTO. In sum, judges second-guess the need for the copyright in-
centive when they are satisfied that patent law will handle the
matter.
The grandparent of these cases is Baker v Selden.15' Selden
wrote books setting forth what he claimed was a new bookkeeping
system that "effects the same results as book-keeping by double
entry; but, by a peculiar arrangement of columns and headings,
'8' See text at notes 109-11.
152 But see Sheldon, 81 F2d at 54 (opaque dictum that Sheldon's "whole contribution
may not be protected; for the defendants were entitled to use, not only all that had gone
before, but even the plaintiffs' contribution itself, if they drew from it only the more gen-
eral patterns; that is, if they kept clear of its 'expression' ") (emphasis added).
1-1 101 US 99 (1880).
[58:119
Copyright at the School of Patent
presents the entire operation, of a day, a week, or a month, on a
single page, or on two pages facing each other, in an account-
book.' 1 54 Baker copied the same system in his own publication and
Selden sued him for infringement. The Court ruled for Baker,
holding that "[t]he description of the art in a book, though enti-
tled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive
claim to the art itself.' ' 55
According to the incentive theory of patent law, copyright
analysis of this problem properly would begin by defining what
Baker took from Selden. The Court did compare the two works in
this way. 56 The next step would ask whether Selden made that
thing through costly investment or simply borrowed it from some
other existing source. If the former, Selden ought to win the
suit-unless Baker could demonstrate that Selden would have cre-
ated the thing without the promise of the copyright incentive. The
Court ruled for free rider Baker, however, without pausing to in-
quire whether Selden had made or borrowed the thing Baker took.
In terms of the incentive analysis presented here, the Court
seemed confident that the promise of copyright was superfluous to
any creative effort by Selden. The Court's reason seemed to be
that copyright law need not provide incentives for this sort of crea-
tion because patent law already has the problem in hand. 57
This confidence seems defensible. The creation of a new sys-
tem of bookkeeping does seem to be an innovation that proceeds
most efficiently from initial library research. Accounting sounds
like a cumulative discipline in which advances build upon each
other in a self-consciously progressive manner. This surmise
scarcely is the product of scientific inquiry. But the studied incre-
mentalism of accounting contrasts with the writing of music, plays,
and fiction-where judges lack the confidence to insist that cre-
ators must begin their work with library research. 58
Moreover, the Baker Court created coherent innovation policy.
In effect, it imposed upon creators of new accounting systems the
duty of a literature survey and then assigned to the patent bureau
'5' 101 US at 100.
155 Id at 105.
See id at 100.
1 Id at 102 ("To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art de-
scribed therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a
surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of
copyright.").
158 But compare Nash, 899 F2d at 1540 ("Intellectual (and artistic) progress is possible
only if each author builds on the work of others.").
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the particularized task of checking the individual warrant for each
inventor's patent incentive. 5 9 For well over a century, courts and
the patent office indeed have considered new processes to be a fit
subject for patents. 6 0 Selden himself had applied for a patent on
his new process.16' The Baker Court noted only that his applica-
tion had been unsuccessful. 162 This refusal to comment on the pat-
entability of Selden's invention is understandable, for patent law
long has contained a variety of ill-defined and poorly justified rules
governing the sorts of processes it will protect.' 6 ' The Baker Court
logically could elide the questions of the precise nature of these
patent rules and whether they make sense. So can I. We both con-
clude that the copyright law justifiably dumps in the lap of patent
law the problem of whether and when to protect systems and
processes. This conclusion is limited, but sufficient to justify
Baker's result. Congress has codified this judicial judgment. The
1976 Copyright Act denies copyright protection to any "procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery."' 64 Conversely, the Patent Act of 1952 directs that "[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process ... may obtain a
patent therefor .... 65
'5 Compare text at notes 84-88.
180 See, for example, Tilghman v Proctor, 102 US 707, 723 (1880); Cochrane v Deener,
94 US 780, 787 (1876).
181 Baker v Selden, 101 US 99, 25 L Ed 841, 841 (1880) (argument of counsel).
162 101 US at 104 ("Whether the art might or might not have been patented, is a ques-
tion which is not before us. It was not patented, and is open and free to the use of the
public.").
163 See, for example, Ex Parte Turner, 66 Official Gazette 1593, 1894 CD 36 (Decisions
of the Commissioner of Patents) ("A patentable process must accomplish some change in
the character or condition of material objects; hence a plan or theory of action which, if
carried into practice, could produce no physical results proceeding direct from the operation
of the theory or plan itself is not an art within the meaning of the patent laws.") (emphasis
added); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v Walker, 146 F2d 817, 821 (9th Cir 1945)
("mental steps, even if novel, are not patentable"). But see Paine, Webber, Jackson & Cur-
tis, Inc. v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F Supp 1358, 1369 (D Del 1983)
'(upholding patent on data processing method for Merrill Lynch's Cash Management Ac-
count). Compare Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 186 (1981) ("an algorithm, or mathematical
formula, is like a law of nature, which cannot be the subject of a patent"), with United
States Patent No 4,744,028 (May 10, 1988) (in effect patenting Karmarkar's algorithm for
solving linear programming problems); see Tullock, Intellectual Property, in Kryster, ed,
Direct Protection of Innovation at 178 (cited in note 80) ("My own proposal in the past has
been simply to extend the intellectual property which we call a patent to as many fields as
possible. Currently, the exact border between patentable and unpatentable objects is a
somewhat irregular one and is frequently changed by court decisions.").
164 17 USC § 102(b) (emphasis added).
101 35 USC § 101 (emphasis added). See also id at § 100(b) ("The term 'process' means
process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material.").
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In sum, Baker and its offspring withhold copyright incentives
for creating new systems and processes. The Court never suggested
that Selden came by his accounting system easily. The danger is
that excluding costly creations from copyright protection will dis-
courage creators from bothering to undertake such socially useful
creation in the future. Copyright's response is to rely on patent law
to solve this problem. Patent law supplies the right spur; library
research seems like an important step in the process of creating
new systems and processes, and-unlike copyright-patent law
does hold creators responsible for such research. Moreover, patent
law long has demonstrated its willingness to reward the creation of
systems and processes that it deems appropriately qualified. And
Congress has stamped its general approval on this judicial alloca-
tion of responsibilities. To the question of how copyright law can
abandon support for new processes without injuring consumers,
then, the short answer is that patent law has the situation covered.
5. Judicial willingness to second-guess the need for the copy-
right incentive: Fact works.
Judges also have been willing to second-guess the need for the
copyright incentive for the category of fact works. Two significant
decisions illustrate this law: Hoehling v Universal City Studios166
and Nash v CBS. 67 Both opinions submerged a highly debatable
judicial willingness to dispense with the copyright incentive.
Neither case successfully defended its result. There is reason to
believe, moreover, that both results are simply indefensible in in-
centive terms.
The Hoehling case concerned accounts of the zeppelin Hin-
denburg's fiery demise in 1937. The Second Circuit said that au-
thor Hoehling conducted "exhaustive research" about the event,
including interviews with survivors and other knowledgeable peo-
ple, and in 1962 published a full-length book entitled Who De-
stroyed the Hindenburg? Hoehling's answer to the question in his
title was that a "rigger" (apparently a position on zeppelin crews)
named Eric Spehl sabotaged the ship because a woman he loved
was dedicated to destroying the myth of Nazi invincibility.168
Hoehling's research uncovered a rich factual context, which he
used to embellish his thesis. Ten years later, defendant Mooney
6 618 F2d 972 (2d Cir 1980).
16" 899 F2d 1537 (7th Cir 1990).
168 Hoehling, 618 F2d at 975.
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published a book with a similar thesis and sold motion picture
rights to Universal City Studios, which rewrote the story into a
screenplay for a 1975 movie. Hoehling sued Mooney and Universal
for infringement, claiming that they had copied his Spehl hypothe-
sis. Hoehling also claimed that Mooney's book took 266 facts origi-
nal to his book, while Universal took 75 such facts.16 Mooney and
Universal moved successfully for summary judgment. The Second
Circuit affirmed, declaring that "[s]uch an historical interpretation,
whether or not it originated with Mr. Hoehling, is not protected by
his copyright and can be freely used by subsequent authors....
[F]actual information is in the public domain."'70 The court then
gave its analysis even stronger bite by using it to preempt
Hoehling's state law claims of unfair competition. 7 '
In Nash, plaintiff Jay Robert Nash wrote two books arguing
that the FBI shot the wrong man when it claimed to have killed
John Dillinger during a 1934 sting operation in Chicago. According
to Nash, Dillinger learned of the sting, sent a stooge named Jimmy
Lawrence in his place, and then decamped to California; the em-
barrassed FBI covered up its blunder by planting Dillinger's fin-
gerprints at the morgue. Nash supported this story in part by de-
tailing the physical and photographic differences between Dillinger
and the corpse and by noting that Dillinger's father encased the
corpse in concrete before burial. Nash sued CBS when its televi-
sion series "Simon and Simon" "took from Nash's works the idea
that Dillinger survived and retired to the west coast, and employed
many of the ingredients that Nash used to demonstrate that the
man in the Cook County morgue was not Dillinger.' ' 72 The Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of CBS's motion for
summary judgment, holding that copyright law gave Nash no
rights to his "analysis of history. ' '173
Both courts denied protection for the plaintiffs' original crea-
tion of historical theories without explaining how creators' incen-
tives would survive the rebuff. The Hoehling court begged the
question entirely. "To avoid a chilling effect on authors who con-
template tackling an historical issue or event," the court said,
"broad latitude must be granted to subsequent authors who make
169 See id at 979 n 6.
170 Id at 979.
1 Id at 980.
172 Nash, 899 F2d at 1541.
173 Id at 1543.
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use of historical subject matter, including theories or plots. '17 4
This point presumes that authors will create enough "theories or
plots" for subsequent authors to use, for there is scarce reason to
worry about chilling the use of things that never come into exis-
tence in the first place. Put otherwise, the court measured the
costs but ignored the benefits of copyright.
More obtuse is the court's comment that "there could be no
infringement because of 'the public benefit in encouraging the de-
velopment of historical and biographical works and their public
distribution.' 1'5 Mr. Hoehling no doubt felt keen sympathy for
this public benefit-and astonishment that the court counted the
point against him. Basic copyright logic holds that the way to en-
courage development and distribution is to grant protection. The
court's silence forces speculation on some implicit and unexamined
premise for its application of the law.
One possible premise is that we need not worry about creating
historical facts because they already exist. Lawyers would be curt
with the suggestion, however, that legal research warrants no fee
because it simply collects documents that already exist. In both
cases the error confuses past events (including judicial opinions)
with their investigation, analysis, and presentation. The passage of
time is inevitable; the study of its effects is not.
A different premise is that historical investigation and analysis
are somehow too important to confine them with copyright's exclu-
sivity. One expression of this view simply announces as self-evi-
dent some conclusion like "obviously the first reporter could not
copyright the sinking of the Titanic." A more grandiose version of
the same notion is that "citizens in a democracy must have free
access to a knowledge of their past." In terms of incentives, these
arguments are irrational. Each boils down to the non sequitur that
historical investigation is so important that we must destroy the
incentive to undertake it.
Yet another conceivable premise is that there exists some fun-
damental and relevant difference between fact and fiction. The
events of both cases, however, undermine this distinction. In each
case the defendant used the historical plots and details for their
entertainment value. Movie and television "docu-dramas" resort to
historical topics because life often is more interesting than any-
174 Hoehling, 618 F2d at 978.
17 Id, quoting Rosemont Enterprises v Random House, 366 F2d 303 (2d Cir 1966). See
also id at 980 (preempting state law unfair competition claims to vindicate "the overriding
goal of encouraging contributions to recorded knowledge...").
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thing the available screenwriters can make up. When it is not, the
screenwriters cheerfully change it. Neither defendant Universal
nor defendant CBS held facts in any particular reverence. From
the perspective of incentives, moreover, this distinction seems bi-
zarre. For example, as far as the FBI is concerned, Nash's claim is
fiction. Should one come to believe it, it would be due to the proof
that Nash found and assembled. Yet, the more extensive, careful,
and hence believable the historian's efforts, the more hostile their
reception by the law of copyright. Law thus instructs authors to
scrap the historian's costly travel, boring interviews, painstaking
searching, and frustrating false trails. Instead authors should relax
in easy chairs to dream up tales: products that the law will em-
brace. Hoehling's logic thus makes no sense.
The Nash court made a number of these same criticisms of
Hoehling. It observed that "[a]uthors of fiction do not (necessarily)
need greater incentives than authors of non-fiction.""17 Rather
than make absolute the class of nonfiction, the court cautiously
and ambiguously referred to "speculative works representing them-
selves as fact. '17 In a slightly distorted manner, it also criticized
the Hoehling court for
go[ing] to the extreme of looking at incentives only ex post.
The autho[r] in Hoehling... spent years tracking down leads.
If all of [his] work, right down to [his] words, may be used
without compensation, there will be too few original investiga-
tions, and facts will not be available on which to build.'
Disappointingly, however, the Nash court did not follow these
penetrating criticisms through to a credible incentive account for
its result. Instead, it vaguely counseled nioderation,179 adding that
"law" compelled its decision-even though it belied such recourse
to supposedly settled authority in the preceding paragraph by crit-
icizing unsettled and unfavorable precedent.180
The Nash opinion further noted that Nash's own research re-
lied on others' historical treatments.'8 ' The relevance of this point
176 Nash, 899 F2d at 1542.
177 Id at 1541.
178 Id at 1542 (emphasis added). Compare Hoehling, 618 F2d at 980 ("A verbatim re-
production of another work, of course, even in the realm of nonfiction, is actionable as copy-
right infringement.") (emphasis added).
179 Nash, 899 F2d at 1542.
18 Id; see also id (refusing to apply earlier Seventh Circuit opinion in Toksvig v Bruce
Publishing Co., 181 F2d 664 (7th Cir 1950), favorable to Nash, on the ground that it "has
been justly criticized").
1 Id at 1542-43 ("[Nash's] books are largely fresh expositions of facts looked up in
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is ambiguous. Some might say it showed the justice of ruling
against Nash; Nash was venal to sue CBS for doing what he had
done himself-presumably without regard for the niceties of copy-
right, although the court cited no evidence on this point. This fo-
cus on ex post fairness, however, misinterprets the passage. First,
Judge Easterbrook, the author of the Nash opinion, has elsewhere
argued persuasively that judges deciding copyright cases should
concentrate their attention on the ex ante incentives they create.'82
Second, Nash did not sue CBS for copying facts about Dillinger
that Nash in turn simply had "looked up in other people's
books."'183 Had he done only this, Nash's claim would have been
like Nichols's and properly ought to have met the same fate.
Rather, Nash had invested a good deal more effort in his theorizing
about Dillinger.84 Had Nash copied from others, that fact might
lead these others to sue Nash. But that fact dictates judgment for
CBS only under the rule that two wrongs make a right.
Alternatively, the court might have believed that Nash's reli-
ance on others' historical treatments showed that Nash knew that
the law of copyright has never protected "historical facts." Such
evidence indeed would be significant to an analysis of incentives; it
would show that something besides copyright protection must have
motivated Nash's creation. This implication is doubtful, however,
even if we indulge the conjecture that Nash had not sought copy-
right permissions from his sources. To the contrary was earlier
Seventh Circuit precedent, upon which Nash could have relied and
which the court had to dismiss before ruling against him. 185 More-
over, Nash could reasonably have believed that his own incidental
use of others' works was fair use, but that more extensive appropri-
ation of his original thesis would not be. 6 The fact that Nash had
other people's books .... Consider the introduction [to one of Nash's other books:] ....
'The author's own files, exceeding more than a quarter of a million separate entries and a
personal crime library of more than 25,000 volumes, were heavily employed.' The producers
of Simon and Simon used Nash's work as Nash has used others' .... ).
182 See Easterbrook, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 109-12 (cited in note 72); Easterbrook,
98 Harv L Rev at 21-29 (cited in note 75). See especially id at 24.
183 Nash, 899 F2d at 1543.
"8' See id at 1538 ("After interviewing many persons connected with Dillinger's gang
and the FBI's pursuit of it, Nash tracked Dillinger to the west coast, where Dillinger mar-
ried and lay low. Nash believes that he survived at least until 1979. [Nash's book] contains
pictures of a middle-aged couple and then an elderly man, who, Nash believes, is Dillinger
in dotage.").
185 See note 180.
188 See text at notes 117-19; compare 17 USC § 107(3) (a factor relevant to fair use is
"the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole").
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relied on others' research to some degree thus cannot justify the
court's refusal to protect his own original and substantial
contribution.
Perhaps to pose a different implication of this observation
about Nash's own borrowing, the Nash court also cited a general
argument from an important journal article by Professor Landes
and Judge Posner.'87 Their argument is original and significant
but, I believe, does not fit the facts of this case. I digress from my
focus upon Nash to treat the analysis of Landes and Posner
directly.
Landes and Posner review the variety of incentives besides
copyright that can prompt the creation of works of authorship.
They point out that authors typically use others' creations in the
process of producing their own. 18  They conclude that authors as a
class might prefer less copyright protection to more, for protecting
historical research with copyright law might do more to increase
authors' production costs than to increase their revenues. If so,
then increasing copyright protection would paradoxically reduce
the extent of new creation. 89 Their analysis thus is not necessarily
that existing incentives suffice, but that additional incentives
would be irrationally costly.
This general insight is clever but implausible on Nash's facts.
It underestimates the revenue benefit and hence incentive effect
that copyright protection would give in cases like Hoehling and
Nash. At the same time, it overestimates the production cost in-
crease that such protection would trigger.
Beginning with the revenue benefits from copyright protection
for historical investigation, the cash from Hoehling's sale to Uni-
versal or from Nash's sale to CBS could be quite substantial, cer-
tainly in comparison to historians' typical earnings. The incentive
potential thus can be sizable. Landes and Posner could correctly
reply, however, that only a tiny percentage of historical treatments
attract attention in Hollywood. In incentive terms, the expected
profit is the relevant figure, and an exceedingly small probability
can decimate a large number of dollars. This point holds for a typi-
cal faculty historian, for whom movie and television rights are but
a joke.
18' Nash, 899 F2d at 1541, citing Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 332-33, 349-59
(cited in note 72).
188 Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 332 (cited in note 72). See also Nash, 899
F2d at 1541 ("every author is simultaneously a creator in part and a borrower in part").
"' Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 329-33, 347-53 (cited in note 72).
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Hoehling and Nash, however, justifiably might resent being
dismissed on the ground that few academicians dream of media
contracts. Each might respond that, unlike tweedy eggheads, popu-
lar historians can choose topics precisely for their popular interest
and hence their media prospects. 190 Zeppelin sabotage, FBI gang-
ster cover-ups-these topics would reap scorn from a tenure com-
mittee, which might phrase its contempt by suggesting that the
candidate seemed to be writing for television. And the committee
might be right. Protecting historical investigation with copyright
quite possibly could yield substantial incentives for some authors
to undertake additional and laborious historical investigation.
Turning to possible production cost increases, these costs
would consist of new royalty payments and new transaction costs.
New royalty payments are unlikely to be prohibitive. Profit-maxi-
mizing copyright owners want to set affordable royalties.' 9 ' (Of
course, a deal beneficial to both parties nonetheless can founder on
inept tactical posturing. But such cases seem like the exception,
not the norm.) We thus can expect copyright owners to set positive
but affordable royalties.
Finally, transaction costs will increase. This fact is cer-
tain-and an inescapable side effect of a desirable phenomenon.
No transaction is entirely costless, and the point of intellectual
property is to prompt contracts that transfer incentive dollars to
creators. Transaction costs thus always will accompany intellectual
property rights, so long as those rights perform their economic
function. (An exception to this statement might be the practically
inconsequential creator who integrates vertically.) The question is
not whether these costs will increase, but whether they will swamp
the revenue benefit from protecting historical investigation.
In some cases cost increases probably would outweigh added
revenue. Publications earn academic historians very little, possibly
even less than zero. These historians probably would earn very lit-
tle more from copyright protection of their efforts, given that they
generally write for small audiences. And although royalty rates for
academic uses would not rationally and typically be very high, his-
torians often use a great number of sources, thus multiplying the
190 A list of Nash's other titles is suggestive: Darkest Hours: A Narrative Encyclopedia
of Worldwide Disasters from Ancient Times to the Present; Murder, America: Homicide in
the United States from the Revolution to the Present; Look for the Woman: A Narrative
Encyclopedia of Female Prisoners, Kidnappers, Thieves, Extortionists, Terrorists, Swin-
dlers and Spies from Elizabethan Times to the Present; and Murder Among the Mighty:
Celebrity Slayings that Shocked America. Nash, 899 F2d at 1538 n **.
"I See, for example, Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 336 (cited in note 72).
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costs of the transactions. Moreover, scholars are supposed to be a
critical bunch, raising the prospect that copyright owners might re-
fuse permission for fear of criticism.192 Thus even slight increases
in production costs would be likely to outweigh the benefits from
protection and to substantiate Landes and Posner's fear of dimin-
ished output.
These cases argue for particularized application of the fair use
defense, however, and not for general exclusion of historical in-
quiry from copyright protection."9 3 Copyright's doctrine of fair use
protects scholars who use a large number of research sources. Sec-
tion 107, which codified law on the topic, generally provides a de-
fense "for purposes such as . . . scholarship, or research.' 1 94 Sub-
section (1) of that section makes relevant "the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."'95 The fair use
doctrine is notoriously confused. But the case of research scholars
making use of others' work in an academic publication is a core
example of the defense. 96 Another core case, as Landes and Posner
point out, is the "high-transaction-cost case," where "the costs of a
voluntary exchange are so high relative to the benefits that no such
exchange is feasible between a user of a copyrighted work and its
owner."'
97
The strength of a fair use defense for these cases ought not
dictate that copyright protection be unavailable for cases like
Hoehling and Nash, where the facts differ considerably. Thanks in
part to opinions like Sheldon, entertainment companies are accus-
tomed to bearing the costs of transacting royalty arrangements
with authors. There is every reason to believe that incentive effects
in such cases would be tangible and positive. Conversely, there is
every reason to believe that "[r]educing the return on such effort,
by allowing unhindered use, would make the initial legwork less
attractive and so less frequent."' 98 This reduced creative output is
likely whether or not we hypothesize some ex ante agreement by
192 Compare Eisenberg, 56 U Chi L Rev at 1054-55 (cited in note 78) (describing a
similar problem for patent law).
191 Compare Eisenberg, 56 U Chi L Rev at 1074-78 (cited in note 78) (analogous pro-
posal for "experimental use exemption" from patent liability).
19 17 USC § 107.
19 Id.
196 See HR Rep No 94-1476 at 65-66 (cited in note 4).
197 Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 357. (cited in note 72); Wendy J. Gordon,
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and
its Predecessors, 82 Colum L Rev 1600, 1627-30 (1982).
199 Nash, 899 F2d at 1542.
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authors on copyright protection, for choosing this protection level
ex ante would simply deter this type of investment ex post.'99 In
sum, the Nash court mistakenly relied on Landes and Posner's
suggestion that copyright protection for historical investigation
may bring more costs than benefits.
Returning to the Nash opinion, we also return to the question
of whether there is reason to believe that, absent copyright, other
incentives suffice to prompt historical investigation. The two most
likely alternative incentives are the first-mover advantage and
public subsidies for creation. Neither offers much basis for the ju-
dicial willingness to second-guess the need for copyright, sug-
gesting that Hoehling and Nash were wrongly decided.
The first-mover or lead-time advantage argument would waive
legal incentives on the grounds that the desire to be first to market
is an alternative incentive. This argument is exceedingly problem-
atic as a general matter. The danger is the slippery slope: that such
thinking will conclude that we can dispense with creation incen-
tives entirely. This view might be correct. We have no proof that it
is, however, and it is at odds not only with two centuries of copy-
right policy but also with Congress's action in 1976 after Professor
(now Judge) Breyer had advanced just such arguments.200 Federal
judges thus ought to feel little liberty to indulge the claim that the
race to market obviates the need for copyright protection.
Nonetheless, one still might believe that copyright is superflu-
ous to the daily, weekly, or monthly reporting of current news and
events. People want to read or hear news that is hot. News media
build reputations on scoops, and reputations sell subscriptions and
advertising. This rationale may justify the otherwise puzzling say-
ing that there is no copyright in news, thus warranting the aboli-
tion of copyright protection of investigation of recent history.2 1
199 Compare Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 333 n 13 (cited in note 72)
("[A]uthors may... differ among themselves on where to set the level of copyright protec-
tion. Authors expecting to borrow less than they are borrowed from will prefer more copy-
right protection than those expecting to be net borrowers. Ex ante, however, before anyone
knows whether he is likely to be a net 'debtor' or 'creditor,' authors should be able to agree
on the level of copyright protection.").
100 Compare Breyer, 84 Harv L Rev at 299-302 (cited in note 78) (expressing skepticism
about need for much copyright protection at all, partly on grounds of the adequacy of the
first mover advantage), with 1976 Copyright Revision Act, Pub L 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, codi-
fied at 17 USC, Copyrights (1977) (generally expanded the scope and duration of copyright
protection).
201 See, for example, International News Service v Associated Press, 248 US 215, 234
(1918). But see id at 235 (concluding that a similar common law right must punish routine
copying by a competing newspaper to ensure "the added profit so necessary as an incentive
to effective action in the commercial world"). See also Richard A. Epstein, International
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A second alternative incentive is subsidy. To support research
of history that is not recent, the United States uses a different tool
than property rights to solve the public goods problem. Taxpayers
subsidize historians. Nearly all research universities have history
departments and nearly all receive public funds. Faculty members
in these departments are supposed to publish or perish. These sub-
sidized creators are exceptions in the American world of private
property incentives. But as such, these historians do assure copy-
right judges that the public has provided itself with the means for
a good deal of historical research, entirely apart from the harvest
of copyright.
These sources, however, offer no support for the judges who
wrote Hoehling and Nash. Hoehling and Nash still can complain.
Each devoted years to investigating events long past, for which no
special prize exists for scooping rivals. We have no reason to trust
lead-time protection against verbatim copying as sufficient to
prompt such investment. As far as the record shows, neither au-
thor received public research monies.2 °2 These alternative incen-
tives exclude Nash, Hoehling, and similar authors.
We probably will get a good deal of historical reporting and
analysis no matter what copyright policy judges set. But it seems
that a different judicial policy could give us more, and that the
benefit would exceed its costs. This tentative conclusion may seem
counterintuitive. But the most obvious evidence is the least useful.
There does seem to have been no shortage of published historical
theories or plots, whether we mark the time since Hoehling's deci-
sion in 1980 or begin at some earlier date. Yet what we see is not
necessarily what we could have gotten. Uncreated work is odorless,
tasteless, and invisible. We could be suffering a shortage compared
to a world of plenty we have never known.
These speculations about incentives badly need scholarly in-
vestigation. In theory, economists or statisticians could pick a date
of decisive policy change and look at data (if they exist) to discover
changes in the output of historical works. Or instead of a time se-
ries study, the focus could compare a cross section of different na-
tional or international jurisdictions to isolate the effects of with-
holding or granting this copyright incentive. Or one might
systematically poll authors or publishers to discover whether their
News Service v. Associated Press: The Role of Custom and Law in Creating Property
Rights in News, 77 Va L Rev - (forthcoming 1991).
22 Compare Nash, 899 F2d at 1541 ("The prospect of reward is an important stimulus
for thinking and writing, especially for persons such as Nash who are full-time authors.").
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attitudes confirm or deny the importance of the copyright pol-
icy.2 03 Any clear finding-including a finding of no relationship at
all between doctrine and output or attitude-would have powerful
implications for judges. No one has begun this research agenda,
however, and merely to state it is to suggest its predictable
weaknesses.
Judges meanwhile must use their best practical judgment
about sound policy. It has been the first object of this section to
reveal such judgments as the policy declarations that they in fact
are. The second object of this section has been to apply common
sense to the conventional wisdom of two recent judicial opinions.
This analysis strongly suggests the need for further consideration
of the aggressiveness with which judges have refused protection to
the fruits of historical investigation.
The key to the dilemma of idea and expression is that this
doctrine performs the same function for copyright law as patent
examiners do for the law of patents: to evaluate the would-be
property owners' works in order to give them a precise statement
of their rights. Before granting any rights, patent examiners assess
an applicant's contribution against all recorded innovation in the
field to develop a precise and general statement of its novel and
nonobvious aspects. Copyright law instead grants protection that is
completely vague but nonetheless in effect from the moment of a
work's creation. Only in the enforcement stage does it deploy the
doctrine of idea and expression to specify rights in a meaningfully
detailed fashion.
With this realization, we can extract from the leading cases a
concrete and sensible way to generate the conclusory labels of idea
and expression. This approach ignores the words "idea" and "ex-
pression" and instead concentrates on what courts do, not what
they say. First, the courts compare the plaintiff's and defendant's
works to define as specifically as possible the exact thing that the
defendant took from the plaintiff. Second, they determine whether
that thing was original to the plaintiff in the sense that this Article
uses the word: did its creation require costly investment by the
plaintiff, presumptively in reliance on the promise of copyright
protection, or was its creation merely the inexpensive borrowing of
'" Compare Richard C. Levin, et al, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Re-
search and Development, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No 3 at 783 (1987) (poll
about patent importance).
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some extant thing with which experts in the field would be readily
familiar? If the former, the defendant infringes by taking the
plaintiff's expression; if the latter, the defendant acts legally in
taking only the plaintiff's idea. In making this evaluation of origi-
nality, copyright judges ought to mimic patent law's practice of re-
lying on experts in the field, for the experts can explain what those
with ordinary skill in the art know without the library research
that copyright law wisely has refused to require of authors.
This patent-based incentive analysis reveals that copyright
law should tie the idea/expression dichotomy closely to copyright's
definition of originality, as well as to its use of expert opinion. The
dichotomy in fact simply clarifies that what copyright means by
"new" is "new to an ordinary author's untutored consciousness."
The analysis aligns well with the key opinions of Nichols and Shel-
don. It reveals that other judicial decisions refusing to protect
plaintiffs' costly creations are debatable policy decisions, not the
hopelessly arbitrary consequences of an unreviewably metaphysical
doctrine. Judges have been willing to second-guess the need for
copyright protection in several areas, including the creation of sys-
tems and processes and the formulation of historical plots or theo-
ries. Analysis supports the reluctance to provide copyright protec-
tion to the former, but suggests a need for greater protection of the
latter.
Innovation policy can never abolish uncertainty. But those
who make and study the policy ought to be able to agree on the
right questions to ask and the right method of answering them.
The current doctrine of idea and expression utterly fails on these
counts. Patent law offers copyright doctrine the incentive founda-
tion it needs.
IV. Two QUESTIONs ABOUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT LAW
This Article's focus has been normative. This brief final sec-
tion changes character. It asks two speculative questions of a posi-
tive nature that the literature has neglected but that the preceding
effort makes prominent. First, why do we have separate doctrines
and procedures for patent and copyright law, rather than a single,
unified system of innovation law? Second, why has patent law
made so much more sense than copyright?
The first question becomes obvious if one accepts that copy-
right and patent share the same economic and moral functions.
This Article has stressed the useful implications that flow from
this functional identity. Yet there has been little discussion of why
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we have two different laws to perform the same function. Doctrine
tends to emphasize the differences rather than the similarities be-
tween the fields.20 4 The two legal cultures traditionally differ,
rarely engaging each other in conversation. In part, the legal cul-
tures divide at the wall of mathematics. 20 5 High-tech inventors and
their lawyers generally perceive themselves as having little in com-
mon with the stylishly literate world of novels, publishing, and stu-
dios, and vice versa. Artists think engineers are nerds. Inventors
think fiction and movies are fun but ultimately useless. You never
see anyone wearing both Gucci loafers and a plastic pocket protec-
tor. Yet once the functional similarity of patent and copyright law
is before us, it is a short step to the question of why we have two
bureaucratic procedures and two legal doctrines for what is essen-
tially the same problem.
An undoubtedly correct, but unsatisfying, answer is that dif-
ferent historical accidents initially triggered the different tradi-
tions of patent and copyright. Patent law apparently began in Ven-
ice, which recognized the need to use exclusive rights to promote
particular types of technological innovation as early as 1332, and
by 1432 had enacted a general patent statute uncannily similar to
our own.2 06 Copyright, on the other hand, first arose in England in
1710, when Parliament reacted to the advent of the printing press
by adopting the celebrated Statute of Anne.20 1 These historical
facts do not make for much of an explanation. They do not ac-
count for why the first Congress recapitulated the historic separa-
tion 20 8 instead of merging the statutes into a single law the way the
framers merged the policies into a single constitutional clause. 20 9
Neither do historical facts of this sort illuminate whether we ought
to consider merging the two fields today.
2M See, for example, Bell, 191 F2d at 101-02; Baker, 101 US at 102-05.
2'0 See, for example, C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution: The
Rede Lecture 1959 2-3 (Cambridge, 1959); compare U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
Rules of Practice in Patent Cases § 1.341 at 68 (GPO, 1983) (requiring patent lawyers to
possess "sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters").
210 See Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J Pat
Off Society 711, 714-16 (1944). See also Frank D. Prager, The Early Growth and Influence
of Intellectual Property, 34 J Pat Off Society 106, 126 (1952).
210 See Harry Ransom, The First Copyright Statute 94-117 (Texas, 1956). See also
Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the
Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 Wayne L Rev 1119 (1983); Francine Crawford, Pre-
Constitutional Copyright Statutes, 23 Bull Copyright Society 11 (1975); Karl Fenning, The
Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 Georgetown L J 109
(1929).
08 See text at notes 1-2.
209 See text at note 77.
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
A more satisfying, but still partial, explanation stresses the
different characters of the innovative processes the two regimes
protect. I have contrasted the necessarily incremental character of
patentable innovation with the nature of "authorship," which
judges properly have been reluctant to insist must begin with li-
brary research. This difference does explain why patent law de-
mands novelty and nonobviousness while copyright does not. It
does not, however, account for the notable procedural differences
between the fields. Patent law requires that a federal agency nego-
tiate a precise and acceptable statement of applicants' rights as a
condition of the property grant. Copyright law makes protection of
an unspecified character commence with a work's creation, but the
protection is refined in a precise way only if and when a court ad-
judicates an infringement suit. There is nothing inevitable about
consigning patents to bureaucrats and copyrights to judges. Con-
gress could have ordered a bureau to administer copyright law, for
instance, or consigned patents exclusively to the courts. The ques-
tion remains why we use one procedure for granting patents and
another for copyrights.
The answer is a simple matter of volume. An early agency def-
inition of a creator's rights does reduce uncertainty and facilitate
transactions. But such individualized agency review is costly and
time-consuming, even for the relatively small number of yearly
patent candidates. 10 In 1987, for instance, inventors filed about
140,000 patent applications, while authors registered more than
four times as many works of authorship.21" ' This comparison vastly
understates the number of copyrights created each year, for au-
thors do not register the majority of works that they fix in tangible
media of expression. (Compare, for instance, the number of works
that you have fixed in a tangible medium of expression-memos,
reports, essays, tapes, computer files, photographs, etc.-with the
number that you have registered with the federal government.)
The nation in its entire history has granted only 5.27 million pat-
ents.212 It would not be surprising if a country of a quarter of a
210 See text at note 212. Compare Tullock, Intellectual Property, in Kryster, ed, Direct
Protection of Innovation at 187 (cited in note 80) ("The present system however, wastes a
great deal of resources in having patent examiners examine patents which will never be
applied.").
211 See Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 530 (Table 874, "Patents and Trademarks:
1961 to 1987") and 550 (Table 917, "Copyright Registration, by Subject Matter: 1985 to
1987") (1989).
22 July 31, 1990 telephone call to PTO patent search room (current numbering system
lists 4,945,570 utility patents, 7,287 plant patents, and 309,664 design patents). See also U.S.
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billion people created that number of different written documents,
photographs, and works of art and music in a single day. To ex-
tend copyright protection so widely by means of individualized
agency inspection would lead to paralyzing costs. Congress was
wise to give inventors the certainty of advance and individualized
agency definition of rights claims when possible. But when the vol-
ume of creation made agency review prohibitive, Congress likewise
was wise to relegate authors to the less informative but cheaper
alternative of delayed but sporadic adjudication.
Turning to the second question, I return to my opening para-
dox. Why have policymakers been more successful in making sense
of patent law than of copyright? The answer, I believe, is at least
in part that copyright has faced a more difficult problem than has
patent law. Patent law's technological focus is forbidding to most
lawyers and judges. But ultimately the copying that patent law
seeks to curb is primitive: understand the inventor's principle and
make a thing that embodies it. This process of handmade imitation
is paleolithic. Patent law has governed monkey-see, monkey-do
replication for centuries; and all the while the form of copying has
remained pretty much the same. Copyright law has seemed more
accessible to lawyers, who to some degree inevitably are authors
themselves. But in fact the technologies of copying are various and
evolving: first came the printing press, then the camera and
photocopier and tape recorder, now the plug molding process, com-
puter disks, samplers, and videocassette recorders. Patents control
the rudimentary duplication of high technology. Copyrights must
cope with wide technology copied in evolving and ever more so-
phisticated ways. It is not surprising that patent law beat copy-
right to coherence.
CONCLUSION
Professor Goldstein begins his recent copyright treatise by ob-
serving that the statute "leaves three of the great questions of
copyright primarily to the judiciary: What constitutes original au-
thorship qualifying for protection? Where should the line be drawn
between a work's unprotectible ideas and its protectible expres-
sion? What constitutes infringement?121 3 The judiciary has found
these problems daunting. The most forbidding has been the prob-
Patent and Trademark Office, Index of Patents: Part II, Index to Subjects of Inventions
540 n 1 (GPO, 1988) (9,957 patents granted before new numbering system introduced in
1836).
1,- Paul Goldstein, 1 Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice 1 (Little, Brown, 1989).
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lem of the idea/expression dichotomy. At the end of his career,
Judge Learned Hand declared it simply insoluble.214 Judge Easter-
brook recently seconded the motion: "After 200 years of wrestling
with copyright questions, it is unlikely that courts will come up
with the answer any time soon, if indeed there is 'an' answer,
which we doubt."2 15 Although less eloquently candid, courts strug-
gling to define originality and the proper role of experts in in-
fringement cases also have found cause for despair.
The lamp of patent can illuminate these problems, which turn
out to be of a piece. Patent law shows that experts can identify
those instances in which the incentive of property rights is not nec-
essary to prompt creation. With this help, copyright courts can ad-
just their definition of originality to exclude works that are so easy
or routine to create that they would arise without the need for
copyright protection. Patent law also provides a model for tran-
scending the maddening metaphysics of idea and expression. It im-
plies that copyright judges ought first to compare the two works at
issue to define as specifically as possible the thing that the defen-
dant took from the plaintiff. Second, judges ought to determine
whether this taken thing was itself taken by the plaintiff from the
cultural tradition known to those in the field, an idea in the doc-
trine's conclusory parlance, or rather was created through costly
personal investment, an expression.
These implications of patent law's wise treatment of incen-
tives provide an alternative to the embarrassment of opinions de-
claring that "decisions must inevitably be ad hoc" while at the
same time reversing lower courts' judgments-a posture that in-
vites cynicism if believed. They would permit courts to abandon
the elastic antics of merger doctrine and to define the relevance of
expert opinion. These proposals are not free from uncertainty; no
rule that turns upon matters of opinion ever is, and the definition
of innovation at heart is just that. But these proposals are inter-
nally consistent, logically and judicially tractable, and socially ben-
eficial. The patent analogy permits judges and lawyers to ask sensi-
ble questions rather than looking to perverse or incoherent rules.
The patent model tracks some of copyright's leading case law.
It does not, however, make all the doctrine into a seamless web.
214 See text at notes 22-24.
215 Nash, 899 F2d at 1540. See also Shaw v Lindheim, 908 F2d 531, 534 (9th Cir 1990)
("It is thus impossible to articulate a definitive demarcation that measures when the simi-
larity between works involves copying of protected expression; decisions must inevitably be
ad hoc.") (reversing district court grant of summary judgment for defendant).
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Instead, this perspective casts critical light on a number of impor-
tant cases, suggesting that they at least require more thoughtful
justification, and possibly outright reversal.
This perspective also poses some basic but neglected questions
about the structure of American innovation policy. It suggests that
we have two separate systems of patent and copyright in part be-
cause of the differing nature of innovative processes, but mainly
because inventors are so much rarer than authors. Finally, it
speculates that copyright's intellectual structure has lagged behind
patent's for a surprising reason. Although lawyers are fond of re-
garding patent law as technologically arcane, in fact it is copyright
that has faced greater challenges from shifting technology. From
printing press to hard disk, the technologies for copying copy-
righted work continue to multiply. The basic technology of copying
inventions, however, has changed little since one hominid saw an-
other waving a club and then reached for a stick.

